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ABSTRACT

Intellectual property rights have become an integral issue to international trade due to
the pressure from developed countries. Developing countries are usually reluctant to
adopt advanced measures of IPR protection because of their limited capacities.
However, they have been pressured to accept the TRIPS Agreement as part of the
WTO single undertaking. Nevertheless, developed countries are still dissatisfied with
the multilateral level of IPR protection. Developed countries are thus pursuing free
trade agreements that include IPR measures beyond the TRIPS, known as the TRIPS
Plus. The U.S. FTAs are famous with their ambitious TRIPS Plus provisions. Those
provisions raise fears in many developing countries about the effects of the TRIPS
Plus trends. However, the U.S. has managed to enter into FTAs with many developing
countries which are motivated by political and commercial benefits. Egypt has very
special relations with the U.S. and thus the possibility of an FTA was examined
informally by both countries. These FTA preparations were terminated for
undisclosed political reasons. The probability of a sudden revival of the FTA
preparations is omnipresent, thus it is precautionary for Egypt to examine its ability to
conform to IPR standards in the U.S. FTAs apart from the pressure of negotiations.
The Egyptian IPR Law is frequently criticized by many developed countries including
the U.S. for non compliance with the TRIPS measures. This paper will study first
Egypt's compliance with its international IPR obligations. Second, the paper will
provide a legal comparison between the Egyptian Law and the U.S. FTAs, with a
special focus on that of Morocco. Third, the paper will examine policy concerns that
might hinder Egypt's prospects to join an FTA with the U.S.
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I. Introduction
Every country must rely on international trade when it seeks economic growth.
The concept of international trade has been lately extended to include fields that
formerly belonged to domestic domains such as intellectual property right (IPR),
investment and competition.1 IPR has, therefore, become a common factor in any
international trade arrangement, whether bilateral, regional or multilateral. The WTO
has as part of its package of agreements, a specialized agreement on the relationship
between IPR and international trade. This Agreement is known as the Agreement on
Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)2. However, some might
fairly argue that the world has already moved beyond the TRIPS era, and now it has
become mature enough to accept TRIPS Plus measures.
Multilaterally, IPR was dealt with under the umbrella of a U.N. specialized
organization known as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).3 This
organization dealt with IPR from predominantly legal and technical perspectives,
while international trade was only a side issue. The consecutive rounds of negotiations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)4 did not give attention to
IPR till the Uruguay Round establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO).5
Developed countries had been unsatisfied with the WIPO outcomes, and they thus
sought to give a stronger international push for IPR.
The prospects of growth of international trade in terms of volume and scope
were attractive enough to motivate developed countries to insert their IPR interests
under the GATT umbrella. During the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations,
developed countries managed to insert the issue of IPR in the negotiations agenda,
1

Hereinafter IPR.
Hereinafter the TRIPS.
3
Hereinafter the WIPO.
4
Hereinafter the GATT.
5
Hereinafter the WTO.
2
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despite strong reluctance from developing countries. Developed countries were
motivated by the lack of a viable enforcement mechanism under the WIPO or any
other international agency. They also asserted that liberalization of international trade
should be accompanied by better protection of IPR.
Conversely, developing countries opposed this inclusion of IPR under the
GATT for several reasons. First, developing countries were concerned about the
negative effects of the monopolistic rights conferred by IPR on their access to
strategic products, especially of essential medicines. Second, restraints to
dissemination of knowledge necessary to build technological bases also concerned
developing countries. Third, these countries had no interest in the unnecessary
insertion of IPR into international trade regime, which would only further complicate
the Uruguay negotiations. Finally, lack of capacity was a big threat to developing
countries' ability to comply with their new IPR obligations under the GATT.
Developed countries responded by granting developing countries great
flexibilities with respect to their IPR obligations. These flexibilities included
transitional periods to be granted to developing and least developed countries in
implementing their obligations. Technical assistance was also promised in IPR areas
that would be burdensome to developing countries with limited capacities. Moreover,
a major tradeoff for the IPR obligations was made with developing countries by
including agricultural products in the multilateral trading system. This inclusion was
of great significance to developing countries as their agricultural exports had
competitiveness in developed countries' markets. This competitiveness is based on the
comparatively cheap labor and raw materials in developing countries. However, these
exports faced the challenges of trade tariff barriers imposed by developed countries to
protect the interests of their strong agricultural lobbies.

2

The Uruguay Round negotiations were successful in the establishment of the
WTO, with its list of agreements known as the "Uruguay Package". These agreements
are binding on all WTO members, as part of the multilateral single undertaking. The
WTO has also a relatively efficient enforcement mechanism under its subsidiary
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).6
Moreover, the "Uruguay Package" included a specialized agreement on the
relationship between IPR and intentional trade. This agreement is called the WTO
Agreement on the Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. This
agreement sets an international precedence of linking IPR to international trade. Its
obligations take a strictly legal and procedural form. Countries are obliged to change
their laws in accordance with the TRIPS standards. WTO members are fully free to
adopt more ambitious IPR provisions than those in the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS,
however, acts as a benchmark to determine any additional levels of IPR protection.
At the preferential level, WTO members can adopt more ambitious standards
than those in the TRIPS. Such additional standards could be derived from either a
regional or bilateral agreement that is usually referred to as "free trade agreement"
(FTA).7 Sluggish progress in WTO negotiations has encouraged its members to
conclude more FTAs. Parties of such FTAs are both developing and developed
countries. Each country has selected IPR interests that may not be satisfied under the
WTO TRIPS terms and thus tries to attain more favorable FTAs through bilateral
negotiations with key trading partners. Favoring the FTA alternative is also because
negotiation burdens at the bilateral level are less than those at the WTO level.

6

Hereinafter the DSB.
Hereinafter FTA.

7
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Bilateral negotiations only address interests of two countries instead of the large
number of WTO members.
Developed countries like the U.S. enter into FTA negotiations with developing
countries to pursue their areas of priority. For the U.S., IPR is one of the key issues,
especially with respect to FTAs with lesser trading partners like those of the Middle
East. Lack of proximity of some trading partners limits the scope of trade in
agricultural goods. The U.S. normally focuses its FTA negotiations on trade interests
like IPR that aren't hindered by distance. The FTA provisions on IPR are known as the
TRIPS Plus. These FTAs provisions vastly exceed the level of protection provided by
the TRIPS and the U.S. FTAs have the highest international level of IPR protection. In
contrast, the E.C.'s Association Agreements have relatively limited emphasis on IPR
compared to other issues like trade in agricultural products.
On the other hand, countries with legal systems that fall short of their TRIPS
obligations are described as TRIPS Minus. This description applies to countries that
are currently in the stage of accession to WTO or WTO members that have enacted
TRIPS deficient IPR laws. The deficiency of the laws is frequently the result of public
hostility to the TRIPS objectives and effects. TRIPS Minus countries have little
chance to join FTAs with the U.S. unless there is substantive legal reform to their IPR
laws. Occasionally, the U.S. enters into negotiations with TRIPS Minus countries
eliciting strict promises of law reform at later stage.
Informal joint FTA preparations between Egypt and the U.S. took place in
2005, but were terminated for unannounced political reasons. It behooves Egyptian
policy makers to examine the conformity of the Egyptian IPR Law with the IPR
standards endorsed by the U.S. FTAs in anticipation of future negotiations with the
U.S. This precautionary examination will be very useful if these FTA preparations are

4

revived one day. The number of Arab countries that are parties to the U.S. FTAs is
increasing. It is thus reasonable to project a revival of the preparations in the near
future as a natural outcome of the special political relations between the U.S and
Egypt. It is also useful to carry out this examination apart from the pressures of
immediate negotiations with a developed country like the U.S. The intense pressures
of the negotiations on the Government of Egypt to adopt TRIPS Plus provision, might
preclude thoughtful examination of the Law. The Egyptian Government needs to be
well protected against US pressures confronting a pincher with domestic ones. The
detection of the legal gaps between the Egyptian IPR Law and the U.S. FTAs, will
facilitate the policy formulation process in Egypt.
The purpose of this paper is to identify Egypt's vulnerabilities with respect to
IP standards in the U.S. FTAs. Two steps are necessary: first, the examination of
Egypt's compliance with its current international IPR obligations, then a comparative
study between the Egyptian IP Law and the U.S. FTAs.
Chapter 1 of this paper provides an introduction to the issue of IPR in the
context of international trade. It also highlights the purpose and background of this
paper.
Chapter 2 provides an extensive overview of Egypt's current international
obligations in the field of IPR. This chapter identifies the benchmarks from which
policy makers can consider the application of further standards. It covers Egypt's
obligations under the Paris, Berne and Rome Conventions as well as the TRIPS
Agreement. Egypt isn't yet a member of the Rome Convention, but must accede to this
Convention before June 2008, as required by the preferential Association Agreement
with the E.C. and the FTA with the EFTA Group. This chapter includes an

5

examination of the brief IPR provisions encompassed by these preferential
agreements.
Chapter 3 explains major U.S. concerns about IPR protection in Egypt,
specifically in reference to comments from the U.S. annual reports addressing IPR.
This Chapter reviews the USTR Section 301 and National Trade Estimate reports. It
also considers the annual report issued by the International Intellectual Property
Alliance (IIPA) which is influential on the USTR decision making.8 It then considers
the U.S. concerns expressed at the multilateral level under the WTO trade policy
review for Egypt.
Chapter 4 looks directly at the issue of Egypt's conformity with the IP
standards in the U.S. FTAs. A legal comparison between the Egyptian IP Law and the
U.S. FTA with Morocco will be presented. The choice of Morocco was made on
grounds of its great similarity with Egypt in terms of economic conditions. In
addition, both Egypt and Morocco are Arab countries with some similar political
concerns vis –a vis the U.S.
Chapter 5 concludes with summary of the areas of the Egyptian policy
concerning the IPR standards in the U.S. FTAs. A consideration of reports from
various U.N. organizations will be included. Recommendations for the IPR legal
reform in Egypt will be provided as well. In conclusion, this paper focuses on the
vision of the Egypt's prospects of signing an FTA with the US.

II. Exploring International IPR standards That Are Obligatory to
Egypt
8

Hereinafter the IIPA.
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A. Multilateral Treaties
1. The Paris Convention9
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property is the oldest
working IPR legal text, dating from 1883. This Convention was revised several times.
The latest version was revised at Stockholm in 1967 and amended in 1979. It provides
protection to all fields of industrial property. The comprehensive approach of this
Convention was then replaced by that of the WIPO which deals separately with each
form of industrial property. WIPO treaties cover very specific aspects pertaining to
one particular field of industrial property, like registration of trademarks or
classification of patents. The Convention is, almost in whole, incorporated in the
TRIPS.10
a. Patents
Patent provisions under the Convention do not cover all areas pertaining to the
global patent protection system. The Convention only covers some areas without
giving precise details concerning, for instance, term of patent protection. The
Convention covers the priority rights for patents. Such rights make the patent
applicant entitled to priority in his invention in all countries of the Paris Union. This
priority has effect in other countries of the Paris Union even if other applications are
filed by third parties for the same invention. 11 This priority right is only for a limited
period of one year from the filing date in the original country. 12 The second
application filed by the original applicant in another country of the Union is to be
treated as the original application. This second application is completely independent

9

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, (20 March 1883), Stockholm Act
(1967), modified in 1979, Publication of the World Intellectual Property Organization No. 201(E).
10
TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 2.1.
11
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4.A(1).
12
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4C(1) – (2).
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of the first one upon which priority is established. 13 The only link between both
applications is the priority right enjoyed by the applicant for the second application by
virtue of the first one. This means that refusal of the first application has no effect on
the authorities' decision concerning the second application.14
Inventors shall always enjoy the moral right of attribution of their inventions to
their names apart from the transfer of economic rights. 15 The patent is to be treated in
the abstract. A patent only provides the inventor with a negative right to prevent
others from making use of the patent without his consent. However, the patent holder
has to go through other procedures for getting the marketing approval for the patented
product. The competent authority's decision on marketing approval is without
retroactive effect on the patent itself. Accordingly, refusal of marketing approval shall
not prevent the applicant from being granted patent protection.16
Patent rights are subject to limitations such as compulsory licenses or
forfeiture. A compulsory license is the first option available to the authorities in the
face of insufficient supply of the patented product. Under compulsory licensing,
competent authorities assign third parties to use the patent to fill in the shortage in the
supply of the patented product. The patent holder does not fully lose his rights to the
patent. The holder's right to prevent third parties from using the patent only becomes
conditionally and partially suspended. Compulsory licensing is justified by the
Convention to avoid abuses of exclusive rights conferred by the patent. 17 Abuses are
considered broadly by the Convention. Failure to work is one example of the possible
grounds for issuing compulsory licenses.18 This failure can be a total failure to make

13

Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4bis (1).
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4bis (1)-(2).
15
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4ter.
16
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4quater.
17
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(2).
18
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(2).
14
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use of the patent or just insufficient use. 19 The compulsory license can only be issued
on the ground of failure to work after "three years from granting the patent or four
years from the date of application".20 This compulsory license is issued unless the
patent holder demonstrates that external factors forced such failure. 21 In contrast,
forfeiture prevents the patent holder from making use of the patent. Forfeiture may
only be resorted to by the authorities in cases where compulsory licenses fail to reach
their objectives.22 Forfeiture can only be made after two years from the date of
issuance of the first compulsory license.23
b. Marks
Marks and patents share some aspects like priority rights. Otherwise, marks
are covered by the Convention in specific provisions. Unlike patents, the priority right
for trademarks under the Convention is only six months from the date of the first
application.24 Marks applications are like patents with respect to their full
independence even from the country of origin. 25 Specific provisions assigned to marks
include the protection of well - known marks. This protection can either be ex officio
or, at least, upon request of an interested party. 26 Marks are protected against all acts
that are likely to cause confusion with the original marks. 27 The period for which
owners of well - known marks can request the cancellation of their registration is "five
years from the date of this registration". 28 However, such a period of limitation isn't
binding on owners in cases of bad faith. 29 "Trade names shall also be protected

19

Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(4).
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(4).
.
21
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(4).
22
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(3).
23
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5A(3).
24
Paris Convention, supra note 9,, at Article 4C(1) – (2).
25
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 6.
26
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 6bis(1).
27
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 6bis(1).
28
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 6bis(2).
29
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 6bis(3).
20
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whether or not they form parts of marks".30 Goods infringing marks or trade names
shall be seized or at least prohibited from importation. 31 Seizure could either be upon
request of an interested party or ex officio by the competent authority. 32 This
prohibition of importation does not apply to goods in transit trade.33 The seizure must
also take place inside the country where the infringement of the mark happened.34
c. False Indications
The Convention provides some measures to combat false indications. False
indications can either be for "the source of the goods or the identity of the persons
interested in the good whether the producer, manufacturer, or merchant". 35 Persons,
whether natural or legal, are considered to be interested parties.36 The false indication
of source can be for either the locality or country of the good. 37 The geographical
indication (GI) is a subsidiary area to false indication that was later introduced to
international trade.
The major difference between false indications of source and GIs lies in the
factor of the geographical place of production of the good as emphasized by the latter.
Geographical indication is thus a specification of the wider concept of false indication
of source. To elaborate, if the indication of source involves a false indication of the
geographical region of its production, then an infringement of a GI occurs.

d. Industrial Designs

30

Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 8.
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 9(1)&(5).
32
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 9(3).
33
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 9(4).
34
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 9(2).
35
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 10(1).
36
Paris Convention, supra note 9,at Article 10(2).
37
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 10(2).
31
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Industrial designs are not covered in the Convention in much detail with
respect to duration and rights conferred by protection. Generally, the Convention
states that "industrial designs shall be protected in all countries of the Union". 38 The
right of priority for industrial designs is determined by the Convention as six months,
like that of marks.39 Forfeiture of industrial designs protection is prohibited by the
Convention on any grounds.40 Meanwhile, the Convention is silent about compulsory
licensing for industrial designs.
e. Unfair Competition
The Convention covers the issue of unfair competition in an extremely broad
manner that would later be the TRIPS foundation of the legal justifiability of the
protection granted to all forms of IPR. However, the reliance on the concept of fair
competition varies from one IPR form to another. Fair competition is more assertively
referred to in provisions covering some particular IPR forms like undisclosed
information and indications of source. The Convention, in turn, only provides the
obligation to prevent acts of unfair competition, especially those related to
misrepresentation of business information.41
The prohibition of misrepresentation of business information in both the
Convention and the TRIPS aims to protect the public from being misled. 42 The
Convention identifies misrepresentation of one's business to include the nature,
quality, quantity or the characteristics of his goods.43 On the other hand, the act of
misrepresenting information about others can be to either confuse the public or
discredit others' businesses.44
38

Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5quinquies.
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 4.C(1).
40
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 5.B.
41
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 10bis(1).
42
Paris Convention, supra note 9, at Article 10bis(3)3 & TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 22.3.
43
Paris Convention, supra note 9,, at Article 10bis(3)3.
44
Paris Convention, supra note 9,, at Article 10bis(3) 2-3.
39
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2. The Berne Convention45
In addition to the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works is another of the oldest IPR legal texts in the world. It
goes back to the year 1886 and has been revised several times reflecting the evolution
of copyrights. The current version was reissued under the name of the Paris Act of
1971, later amended in 1979. However, this Convention is still referred to by its
historical name "the Berne Convention". The Convention only obliges countries of the
Berne Union to meet the minimum standards of copyright protection endorsed by its
provisions. Those countries are fully free to adopt further protective measures in their
laws.46 The same applies to higher standards provided by agreements between
countries.47
a. Scope of Protection
The scope of protection provided by the Berne Convention covers all forms of
literary, scientific and artistic works.48 The Convention drafters, apparently aware of
the evolutionary nature of copyrights, used concise wording for the scope of copyright
protection. The Convention, thus, provides a long non – exhaustive list of the possible
fields of copyrights. However, this list allows for the future adoption of other
copyright areas like computer programs and compilations of databases. It also sets the
precedent for segregating the collection from its content. This aspect is mentioned in
the Convention with reference to encyclopedias and anthologies, where efforts used in

45

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (9 September 1886), Act
of Stockholm (1967), Publication of the World Intellectual Property Organization No. 282(E), Paris Act
(1971) as modified in 1979 Publication of the World Intellectual Property Organization No. 287(E),
(hereinafter the Berne Convention).
46
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 19.
47
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 20.
48
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 2(1).
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compiling the information deserve their own protection.49 This protection of
compilations is separate from the copyright of their contents.50
b. Rights Conferred
i. Moral Rights
Rights granted under the Convention can be categorized as either moral or
economic rights. Unlike economic rights, moral rights are non - transferable during
the author's life and aren't subject to any limitations of any kind.51 The author always
enjoys the right of attribution of the work to his name. 52 The author also has the right
to object to any alteration of his work in a manner that could adversely affect his
public image.53 Such alterations are redressable by the author.54 Moral rights are also
enjoyed by his successor in title after his death for at least the duration of protection of
economic rights for the same work.55
ii. Economic Rights
Economic rights have more extensive coverage in the Convention with some
specificities pertaining to particular forms of copyright. The first among those
economic rights is the right of translation. 56 The author has the "exclusive right to
make or authorize" the translation of his protected work. 57 This right is subject to a
limitation that it is only enjoyable by countries declaring themselves as developing
countries.58 Those countries have the right to authorize translation of the protected
work to the languages prevailing in their territories. 59 This is only allowed by the
Convention if the author has not made or authorized the translation within three years,
49

Berne, supra note 45, at Article 2(5).
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 2(5).
51
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 6bis(1).
52
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 6bis(1).
53
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 6bis(1).
54
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 2(3).
55
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 2(2).
56
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 8.
57
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 8.
58
Berne, supra note 45, at Appendix, Article II(1).
59
Berne, supra note 45, at Appendix, Article II(2)(a).
50
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or if the authorized copies are out of print.60 This period can be reduced to only one
year if the translation is carried out in a language that is not the same as that of any of
the developing countries members to the Convention.61 This exceptional right granted
by the authorities to third parties is not exclusive or transferable.62
The second economic right is the exclusive right of reproduction of the
original copy created by the author.63 The core principle in this regard is to secure the
author's right to authorize making his work available to the public. Reproduction can
take several forms including broadcasting or cinematographic adaptation. 64 Other acts
of reproduction are only applicable to specific forms of copyright and are thus treated
separately under the provisions of the Convention. For example, "authors of dramatic
and musical works shall enjoy the exclusive right to authorize the public performance
or any communication to the public of this performance of their protected works". 65
Moreover, authors of artistic works and manuscripts enjoy the consistent right to a
share in all the resales made after the original transfer of his economic rights.66
The third economic right is the right to authorize adaptations, arrangements
and other alterations of the protected works.67 The fourth is the author's right to
enforce protection for his works through legal proceedings available under the
legislation of each country.68 Infringing copies of the protected works are to be seized
by the countries whether in their domestic markets or on importation. 69 The
Convention is not specific about the nature of such proceedings and other alternatives

60

Berne, supra note 45, at Appendix, Article II(2)(a)-(b).
Berne, supra note 45, at Appendix, Article II(3)(a).
62
Berne, supra note 45, at Appendix, Article II(1).
63
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 9(1).
64
Berne, supra note 45, at Articles 11bis & 14.
65
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 11(1).
66
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 14 ter.
67
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 12.
68
Berne, supra note 45, at Article15.
69
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 16.
61
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or complementary administrative procedures. This might explain the presence of the
detailed enforcement provisions in the TRIPS Agreement.
c. Terms of Protection
The term of protection of copyright is the author's life plus fifty years after his
death.70 For joint works, the computation of the term of protection starts from the
death of "the last surviving author".71 If the author's life is unavailable, the benchmark
for computing the term of protection is replaced by an alternative method.
Specifically, the term of protection then becomes fifty years from the date of making
the work available to the public.72 This alternative method would cease to apply if,
under any circumstances, the author's name becomes available during the term of
protection.73 The term of protection for photographic works and works of applied arts
is twenty five years from the date of making.74
3. The Rome Convention75
The International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations was completed in Rome in 1961. This
Convention covers forms that are considered integral to the international IPR
protection regime. The peculiar nature of this Convention is that it includes forms that
are not always compatible with the conventional conceptualization of IPR, which
covers products that are the creation of the human mind. The intangibility of these
creations makes them different from ordinary trade in goods. Nevertheless, they
cannot be neglected in commercial law as they hold a considerable value added in all
economic activities. Questions arise with respect to the applicability of IPR
70

Berne, supra note 45, at Article 7(1).
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 7bis.
72
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 7(3).
73
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 7(3).
74
Berne, supra note 45, at Article 7(4).
75
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intangibility to forms of related rights like producers of phonograms. The
entrepreneurial character of phonogram production cannot be compared to the
creativity effort of copyright authors. These phonogram producers, rather, profit from
the creations of others (the authors). They provide only the financial and managerial
leverage necessary to make the creations economically rewarding for the creators.
a. Scope of Protection (National Treatment)
The wide scope of protection provided by the Convention is already stated in
the title of the Convention which provides protection to performers, producers of
phonograms and broadcast organizations. There are sub - scopes in each of the three
fields. All types of protection fall under the principle of national treatment. For
performers, protection is offered by the Contracting States according to the criteria of
place of performance or incorporation of the performance in any of the other two
fields of related rights.76 Performance in one of the Contracting States entails
protection regardless of the nationality of the performers. 77 Incorporation of the
performance into either phonograms or broadcasts doesn't derogate from the
protection granted to performers under the Convention.78
For producers of phonograms, the eligibility for protection depends on either
the nationality of the producer, fixation or publication of the phonogram.79 Nationality
lies in the simple concept of national treatment, in which protection is granted to
nationals of other Contracting States.80 The other two grounds of national treatment
for producers of phonograms are based on the place of production, regardless of the
nationality of the producers.81 Those two grounds of national treatment acts can either
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be the first fixation or publication in another Contracting State. 82 Any State can,
however, choose not to apply either the fixation or the publication criterion.83
For broadcasting organizations, national treatment can be granted according to
the place of either the business headquarters or transmission.84 The place of business is
where the headquarters of the organization are established in another Contracting
State.85 The place of transmission acts as a ground for national treatment under the
Convention if the transmitter is placed in another State of the Rome Union. 86 A State
can, as in the case for producers of phonograms, choose to apply both criteria. 87 In
such a case, for an organization to be eligible for protection it must have its
headquarters and transmit in the same State.88 As the case for performers and
producers of phonograms, the nationality of the organization is not a prerequisite to
protection.
b. Rights Conferred
Rights conferred differ depending upon the field of related rights. They are all
described in the Convention as the minimum rights. This implicitly encourages or at
least enables Contracting States to adopt further measures. Performers have the right
to authorize the acts of fixation, reproduction and public availability. 89 The latter can
be done by either broadcasting or other means of communication to the public. 90
Producers of phonograms "have the right to authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect
reproduction of their phonograms"91. The performers and producers are also entitled to
a "single equitable remuneration" for secondary uses other than those initially destined
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by the performance or production.92 This remuneration is specifically required with
respect to broadcasts or other means of making their performances or phonograms
available to the public.93 Broadcasting organizations have the right to authorize or
prohibit the rebroadcasting, fixation or reproduction of their broadcasts.94
c. Terms of Protection
The term of protection prescribed under the Convention for any of the three
fields of related rights is twenty years.95 For performers, this term is computed from
the date of either the performance or the incorporation of the performance in a
protected phonogram.96 For producers of phonograms, the computation starts from the
date of fixation.97 For broadcasts, it starts from the broadcasting date. 98 Notably, this
term is stated in the Convention as the "minimum duration of protection", which paves
the way for increasing this term under the TRIPS.99
4. The WTO TRIPS Agreement
The TRIPS Agreement presents the benchmark for any given IPR law of any
of the WTO members including Egypt. Any WTO member is free to go beyond the
TRIPS standards or levels of protection as long as there is no contravention to its
provisions.100 Members are practically and legally expected to draft their laws in view
of the TRIPS. The country can then insert additional levels of protection that build on
those specified by the TRIPS. This Agreement, unlike the WIPO approach which
treats each form of IPR separately, treats IPR as a whole.
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The TRIPS has 73 Articles covering various aspects of IPR including
administration and procedures pertaining to the mandate of the TRIPS Council. Some
of the TRIPS provisions, like those on national treatment, most favored nation,
objectives and general principles, treat all forms of IPR equally. Other TRIPS
provisions cover only specific IPR forms, in which redundancy with other provisions
of the WIPO treaties is carefully avoided. This redundancy avoidance occurs only in
the TRIPS text with respect to WIPO treaties that are accepted widely like the Berne,
Paris and Rome Conventions. The approach of the TRIPS is thus to build on the
already existing obligations under the WIPO treaties. This is done by simply
incorporating the core provisions of each of those treaties in their proper context in the
TRIPS.
a. Copyrights and Related Rights
i. Copyrights
The part of the TRIPS covering copyright and related rights, begins by
requiring all WTO members to comply with Articles 1 to 21 of the Berne
Convention.101 The TRIPS then adds measures to those provided by the Berne
Convention. Forms of copyrights that are not provided by the Berne Convention, like
"computer programs and compilations of data", are clearly stated by the TRIPS to be
integral to the copyright scope.102 Specific rights are also added, namely "rental rights
for the public for computer programs and cinematographic works".103 Such rental
rights are not referred to in the Berne Convention.
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Terms of copyright protection are covered in full detail by the Berne
Convention.104 A further elaboration of such terms is provided by the TRIPS, which
makes the computation of the term of protection on the basis of the creation of the
protected work.105 This is only the case where, neither the author nor the date of public
availability is known.106 In contrast, the Berne Convention makes the computation on
the basis of the creation of the work with respect only to cinematographic and
photographic works.107
ii. Related Rights
The TRIPS made more substantive contributions in the field of related rights
than copyrights. The reason for this greater contribution by the TRIPS is that a smaller
number of countries are members of the Rome Convention compared to the Berne
Convention. Accordingly, it was not feasible to make a direct incorporation of the
Rome Convention' provisions in the TRIPS. The TRIPS had, thus, to reiterate some of
the basic provisions encompassed by the Rome Convention. For example, rights
conferred to performers108, producers of phonograms109 and broadcast organizations110
were just reiterated by the TRIPS without any substantial changes.
The TRIPS also elevates the status of protection in other provisions of the
Rome Convention. This elevated protection deals with terms of protection for both
performers and producers of phonograms. These terms are raised by the TRIPS to fifty
years instead of twenty years as provided by the Rome Convention. 111 The basis of
computation for the terms of protection of related rights, unlike those in the case of
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copyrights, are the same in both the TRIPS and the Rome Convention. 112 Meanwhile,
the twenty year term of protection that is provided by the Rome Convention "from the
end of the year in which the broadcast took place" is kept unchanged.113
b. Trademarks
Although the Paris Convention extensively covers various aspects pertaining
to marks, the TRIPS added a limited number of provisions that are effective in
strengthening the protection. Above all, the TRIPS has made a terminological change
from the frequent reference to "marks" by the Paris Convention to "trademarks". This
shift actually suits the contextual nature of the TRIPS' being part of the international
trade regime. The TRIPS sets a term of protection for trademarks of seven years, to be
renewable indefinitely.114 It also extends the protection of well known marks to
services, while the Paris Convention limits the protection to goods. 115 This protection
offered by the TRIPS is ambitious as it requires no registration and has to be carried
out ex officio by members.116
The TRIPS makes a more decisive requirement than that of the Paris
Convention regarding the distinctiveness of the marks.117 The TRIPS gives WTO
members the option of requesting that marks are visually perceptive in order to be
eligible for protection.118 The TRIPS makes the application of border measures to
trademarks obligatory.119 In contrast, the Paris Convention lists a number of options
with respect to seizure on importation. 120 The first option is the seizure on importation
upon request of an interested party or ex officio.121 The second option is the
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prohibition of importation where the law of the member does not permit the seizure. 122
The third option is a temporary one that does not apply to Egypt anymore. It grants
nationals of a country of the Paris Union the same protection granted to nationals of
any other country, if the laws of the latter do not permit seizure or prohibition of
importation.123
The TRIPS is clear that the owner has the right to assign his trademark with or
without the transfer of the business to which the trademark belongs. 124 This provision
replaces the optional character of this obligation under the Paris Convention.125
Compulsory licenses for trademarks are prohibited by the TRIPS, where the Paris
Convention leaves this point unclear.126
c. Geographical Indications (GIs)
The inclusion of this form of IPR in international trade is attributed to the
TRIPS. The Paris Convention only provides protection against false indication of
source, without a reference to the term of GI. Rather, it presents the terms indications
of source and appellations of origin as objects of industrial property.127 In contrast, the
TRIPS provides for full coverage of GIs. However, a controversy over the level of GIs
protection took place in the Uruguay Round while drafting the TRIPS. This
controversy led to a compromise in the text of the TRIPS, which is currently full of
contradictions and ambiguities. This compromise explains the TRIPS' flexibility with
respect to the system of GIs protection offered by each member. WTO members may
choose any legal system under which GIs would be protected, as long as the TRIPS
standards are met. This TRIPS flexibility is different from its precise requirements for
the protection of other IPR forms like patents.
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The TRIPS provisions include the definition of GIs, which specifies "goods
attributed to some geographical area".128 Examples of such GIs include goods like
Cheddar cheese and Bordeaux wine. Exceptions to GIs protection are clearly specified
in the TRIPS. These include an "exception to the protection of GIs for wines and
spirits, that were continuously used in good faith for at least ten years before the entry
into force of the TRIPS".129 Another exception covers some acts pertaining to
trademarks that are identical or similar to GIs. Despite the overlapping with GIs,
trademarks may be entitled protection if they are registered, applied for or used in
good faith, before either the implementation of the TRIPS or the date of GI protection
in the country of origin.130 Moreover, WTO members are not obliged under the TRIPS
to offer protection to GIs that are not protected in the country of origin.131
However, other TRIPS provisions on GIs may produce confusion regarding
the two levels of protection. A review of the historical context of drafting the TRIPS
can help eliminate some of this confusion. The negotiators were divided over GIs into
proponents and opponents. The proponents of GIs in general include countries in what
is known as the Old World, vis -a- vis, those of the New World. The latter term refers
to countries that were discovered in the mid - centuries including the Americas,
Australia and New Zealand. Before discovery, such countries had not developed the
human communities that exist today, and thus, they are unlikely to have their GIs
now. This is due to the fact that a GI is an accumulative gift to a particular community
that develops over generations. The Old World has a lot of interests in GIs, whereas
the New World acts as a free user of GIs. Legitimate grounds for such use are,
however, claimed by the New World. The current inhabitants of many of the New
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World countries are descendants of the Old World, particularly from Europe.
Accordingly, the New World seeks to prevent Europe from claiming exclusivity to
GIs that are currently shared by descendants of the same European origins.
These negotiations led to a compromise between two levels of GI protection.
The initial level now includes all GIs except those for wines and spirits. At this level,
WTO members are obliged to prevent the use of GIs where the public is being misled
about the true origin of the product.132 This means that except for wines and spirits,
members may allow the use of foreign GIs in their territories. The users have to
clearly state the true place of production which may be different from the one implied
by the GI. For example, a Danish company can produce the Egyptian Damietta
cheese, as long as the consumers in Denmark are not misled to believe that it was
produced in Egypt. The additional level of GIs protection is only granted by the
TRIPS at the current stage to wines and spirits. 133 Under this additional level, even the
mention or reference in the course of trade of any kind of the protected GIs for wines
or spirits is prohibited.134 Members are obliged to offer GIs protection upon request of
an interested party, while they have to ex officio protect GIs incorporated in
trademarks.135 The TRIPS doesn't specify any term of protection for GIs, as the
termination of protection after the lapse of this term does not suit the accumulative
nature and the generic proprietorship of GIs.
The TRIPS has a different mandate to the TRIPS Council regarding future
negotiations on each of the two levels of GIs protection. For the first level of GIs
protection, the language of the provisions on the future negotiations is less mandatory
than those of the additional level. Members are instructed by the TRIPS to enter into
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negotiations to increase the scope of the additional level of protection that is currently
granted to wines and spirits.136 The real target of this negotiations mandate is the
elevation of the first level of GIs protection to the additional one. The language of the
provisions on the negotiations mandate for the additional level is much stronger and
straightforward. The provisions on this additional level instruct the "TRIPS Council to
hold official negotiations on the establishment of the multilateral system of
notification and registration of GIs for wines and spirits". 137 The objective of this
multilateral system is only to facilitate and not elevate the protection. 138 This
multilateral system is also voluntary with respect to participation. Members are not
obliged to furnish notification of their GIs for wines or spirits in the event that they do
not have any or are disinterested.139
d. Industrial Designs
The TRIPS makes substantial additions to measures for industrial design
protection offered by the Paris Convention. The TRIPS specifies novelty or originality
as the test for protection. 140 A clear distinction is made between industrial designs and
patents. Protection offered to industrial designs must not be extended to technical or
functional aspects.141 Rights conferred to owners of industrial designs are listed. Such
rights are similar to patents and unlike copyrights. Both patents and industrial designs
give their owners the "negative rights". These rights grant the owners the privilege of
preventing "third parties from making, selling or importing goods bearing their
industrial designs without their consent".142 An infringement can consist of either
copycatting the entire design in full or by partially copying a substantial part.143 The
136
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rights conferred by the ownership of industrial designs are, however, subject to limited
exceptions usually described as the three step test. The steps are: exceptions are
limited, don't prejudice either the exploitation rights or legitimate interests of the
owners.144 The duration of protection is specified to be at least ten years.145
e. Patents
i. Scope and Definition of Patents
This form of IPR is one of the most important to developed countries' interests.
This importance explains the extensiveness and substantiality of the TRIPS provisions
on patents compared to other IP forms like industrial designs. The TRIPS Patents
Section starts by defining patents146. This definition sets three conditions for an
invention to be considered as a patent and thus be protected by its rights conferred by
the TRIPS147. Those conditions are novelty, inventive step and industrial
applicability.148
Some of the conditions may be changed to suit legal systems in some
developed countries. Novelty could be replaced under the TRIPS by non –
obviousness, while industrial applicability could be replaced by utility. 149 Such
changes primarily reflect different scopes for patents applied for in different countries,
which in some cases, include agricultural inventions. The TRIPS definition also grants
protection for patents for both processes and final products. 150 The Paris Convention
doesn't specify inclusion of patents for final products. The TRIPS also mentions that
patent protection applies to all fields of technology without prejudice to the place of
invention.151
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Exclusions from patentability suit the particular nature of patents, those which
might have serious adverse effects on the environment or public order.152 Inventions of
such effects are not granted protection under the TRIPS. 153 Other exceptions have
more serious implications as they cover fields of technology granted optional
protection by WTO members. All other fields except those specified are to be granted
obligatory protection. The excepted fields are diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical
methods for the treatment of humans or animals.154 The same also applies to plants and
animals other than microorganisms.155
For new plant varieties, members are obligated to grant protection either
through patents, a sui - generis system or combination thereof.156 The reason for this
extremely flexible approach is that developing countries have little experience in this
regard, since plant varieties haven't been covered by the Paris Convention. Another
technical reason for this flexibility lies in the fact that agricultural products do not
meet the patentability conditions for industrial application. In contrast, countries that
request the utility of the product for eligibility to patent protection will not face
inadequacy of applying patent conditions to plant varieties. The opposite is true for
countries that require the condition of industrial application of the product for patent
approval. Accordingly, it is more appropriate for these countries to protect plant
varieties by a sui – generis system rather than patents, as the creation of new plant
varieties is not an act of industrial application.
ii. Rights Conferred to Patent Owners
Rights conferred by patents are specified in the TRIPS in a manner that is very
similar to the way rights are conferred for industrial designs except for the issue of
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exhaustion. For product patents, owners have the negative right to prevent third
parties, not having their consent, from "making, using, offering for sale, selling or
importing their protected products".157 Exhaustion applies to all such rights except for
the making of the patented product to avoid duplication of rights conferred to
owners.158 Exhaustion opens the door to parallel importation which provides poor
countries with alternative sources of patented product especially for pharmaceuticals.
For process patents, owners have rights similar to those of product patents,
excluding the making of the process, since it is practically inapplicable in this case. 159
Another difference is the absence of exhaustion.160 A patent is assignable, transferable
or contractible subject to its owner's consent. 161 The term of protection is specified as
twenty years from the filing date.

162

This term is not specified in the Paris

Convention.
iii. Limitations to Rights Conferred by Patents
Despite all rights mentioned above, patent protection has various procedural
and legal limitations. Procedurally, a patent applicant must submit a clear description
of the invention.163 This requirement serves a couple of objectives. The most important
objective is the avoidance of "misappropriation of patents" based on information that
is already available in the public domain. Another objective is the dissemination of
knowledge, which is claimed by the TRIPS to be one of its priorities. 164

The

requirement also aims at quieting fears shared by developing countries regarding
adverse effects of the TRIPS on their developmental potential. The TRIPS also
endorses general exceptions that are similar to those provided for copyrights. For such
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exceptions to be acceptable under the TRIPS Agreement, they have to be limited.
They also should not conflict with the owner's rights or normal exploitation of the
patent. The generic wording of such "limited exceptions" compared to the explicit
wording in compulsory licenses has made them impractical to apply.
The most serious and effective exception to patents is compulsory licensing.
The TRIPS has a long list of conditions for any WTO member trying to use
compulsory licensing.165 However, grounds for issuing such licenses are not
exhaustively listed in the TRIPS. The TRIPS adjusts some of the grounds for only
some of the conditions. These adjustments take the form of attaching the grounds to
particular conditions, or waiving some conditions for some of the grounds. Adoption
of a compulsory licensing system is not an obligation for members. The obligation
comes only when the member decides, before using the system, to abide by the
conditions.166 Ironically, the terminology "compulsory licensing" is not referred to in
the TRIPS. "Other use" (than the limited exceptions) is the description used in the
TRIPS for compulsory licensing.167 WTO documents indicate that the TRIPS
provisions on "other use" actually deal with compulsory licensing. The Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS and Public Health, as well as, its mandated negotiations
explicitly link the conditions of "other use" and the compulsory licensing system. 168
The state has authority for issuing compulsory licensing. "Authorization" is the
method acknowledged by the TRIPS for third parties to be granted compulsory
licenses.169 The compulsory licensee could be either a private third party or the
government.170 The authority competent to issue the license, thus, replaces the patent
owner in giving the authorization where a ground for compulsory licensing applies.
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The conditions for issuing a compulsory license are enumerated in paragraphs
(a) to (l) of article 31 of the TRIPS. Each of the licenses is considered apart from other
patented products.171 Negotiations with the patent holder should precede the use of the
system.172 Good faith is to be exerted in these negotiations, and reasonable terms
should be offered to the holder.173 The obligation to negotiate can be waived in one of
three cases: "national emergency, extreme urgency or public non commercial use".174
The waiver of negotiations is adjusted to the nature of the grounds for issuing the
license. Time availability or commercial purposes will not probably be applicable to
those three cases to require entering into negotiations with the patent owner before
issuing a compulsory license. Negotiations in any of the three cases are replaced by
another obligation to notify the holder. 175 In the first two cases, where the time factor
is critical to meet the purpose of the license, the holder must be notified as soon as
possible.176 In the third case, the holder must be notified promptly as there is no reason
to justify the delay.177

Other conditions for using the compulsory license are not confined to
particular grounds. Those conditions tend to limit the scope of the system so as not to
undermine the patent regime. Above all, the right holder must receive adequate
remuneration computed on the basis of the economic value of the licensed subject
matter. The purpose of the license must not be exceeded by the licensee. 178 The
licensee does not really enjoy any rights except those justified by the objective of
meeting the exceptional circumstances. This license would terminate once its grounds
171
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cease to exist.179 This termination could also take place after the license ground is
reviewed by the issuing authority under request of the legitimate holder. 180 In all cases
of termination, the legitimate interests of the licensee must also be considered. 181 The
license could be issued to several third parties as the license is non – exclusive. 182 This
condition serves the purposes of expanding competition necessary to meet the
exceptional circumstances. The licensee has the sole right to exploit the license but not
to assign it to others.183 All decisions to issue the license are subject to "judicial review
by a higher authority".184
The most significant condition is that use of the licenses be "predominantly
directed towards the supply of the domestic market needs". 185 Practically this means
that every country must rely on its resources to produce compulsory licensed products.
This condition initiated the infamous negotiations over the relationship between the
TRIPS and public health.186

All these conditions are waived in case of anticompetitive practices committed
by the patent holder.187 Logically, limitations to patent rights by compulsory licenses
emanate from the fact that external factors caused the need for the extra patented
products. If external factors are involved in the sudden rise in need for the patented
product, there is no negative reflection upon the patent holder. The opposite is true if
the holder is inflexible in negotiations on increasing the supply to meet this need, or if
anticompetitive practices take place. Anticompetitive practices are severe violations of
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the law that would deprive the holder of its patent rights. The extent of the violation
would determine the degree of deprivation of the privileges granted to the holder.
Thus the TRIPS leaves this issuance of compulsory licensing on the ground of
anticompetitive practices for the determination of the judicial authorities in each WTO
member.188
The compulsory license system is deemed by the TRIPS to be sufficient to
meet public needs or to combat anticompetitive practices. This explains the
extensiveness of the TRIPS provisions covering compulsory licensing compared to
those for revocation or forfeiture. The only requirement for the member to revoke or
forfeit the patent is the approval of the act by judicial review. 189 The clear difference
between compulsory licensing and revocation/forfeiture is the strict legal nature of the
latter part. Revocation/forfeiture seriously prejudice the holder's rights, whereas
compulsory licensing only provides confined and temporary limitations to the rights
conferred by the patent.
Iv. Burden of Proof for Process Patents
The uniqueness of IPR in the realm of international trade has resulted in some
singular procedural aspects in the TRIPS such as the reverse of the burden of proof for
patented processes. The question remains: why does the TRIPS not provide for this
reverse of the burden of proof for patented products? The answer is: violation of
patent rights for final products is easily detected compared to patent process. It is
sufficient for the patent holder to claim that a product with a certain configuration and
serving a particular function is infringing his patent. The documents of registration of
the patent for his product can prove his claim. Documents submitted by a holder while
applying for a patent for his process are not sufficient for proving his rights, as the
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same result could be reached from different processes. The question is then, how do
the judicial or administrative authorities decide on infringement allegations for
patented processes? The logical answer is that the producer must share the processes
used in obtaining the products with the authorities. If the producer shows a process
that is different from the patented process, then the infringement allegation is
dismissed. The TRIPS obligation, in this regard, puts forward two scenarios either of
which is sufficient for the defendant to prove that his process is different from the
patented one. The first scenario is when the defendant presents a new product to the
judicial authorities.190 The second is when the process is being used by the defendant
to produce known products but the patent owner fails to uncover the process actually
used.191 Members are free to follow either scenario to substantiate the violation of the
patented process.192 However, it must first be proved that the product resulting from
the disputed process is identical to that of the patented process. 193 In all cases, the
confidentiality of trade secrets of the defendant must be respected. 194 From the TRIPS
perspective, this requirement could be legally fulfilled only by applying the provisions
of undisclosed information.
f. Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits
The TRIPS adopted the same approach of copyrights and related rights with
respect to this field. The main provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in
respect of Integrated Circuits are incorporated in the TRIPS.195 Rights conferred by
protection of integrated circuits are close to those granted to other forms of IPR. Right
holders of integrated circuits enjoy negative rights to prevent others from "importing,

190

TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 34.1(a).
TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 34.1(b).
192
TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 34.2.
193
TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 34.1.
194
TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 34.3.
195
TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 35.
191

33

selling or distributing their protected works without their consent". 196 The difficulty of
protecting this highly technical IPR form has made the TRIPS provisions flexible with
respect to its violations. Persons not knowing that a protected layout design was
incorporated in a product are not liable under the TRIPS.197 However, once they learn
of the presence of the protection they are required to pay the royalty to the holders. 198
Compulsory licensing conditions for patents are also applicable for layout designs. 199
One major difference between patents and integrated circuits is the more limited
grounds for compulsory licensing for the latter. The only two grounds allowed to
members for integrated circuits are public non - commercial use and combating
anticompetitive practices.200 The TRIPS specified the term of protection for layout
designs as being at least ten years from the filing date. 201 If the member does not
require registration, the term has to be computed from the first commercial
exploitation of the integrated circuit in any place in the world.202 Members may also
terminate the term of protection after fifteen years from the creation of the layout
design.203
g. Undisclosed Information
Undisclosed information is one of the most controversial forms of IPR, thus its
provisions in the TRIPS are very brief. It is also one of the key factors in all almost all
U.S. FTAs. The gap between the levels of protection provided to undisclosed
information by the TRIPS and the U.S. FTAs, reveals the developed countries'
interests in this particular form. Undisclosed information is the broad phrase that
encompasses all types of trade secrets. The Paris Convention does not literally or
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substantially address the protection of undisclosed information. Rather, the concept of
undisclosed information is derived from the Convention Article 10 bis covering unfair
commercial use. The TRIPS distinguishes between undisclosed information in the
broadest sense, and test data submitted to authorities competent for granting marketing
approval for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemical products.204 The TRIPS gives
significant consideration to defining the subject matter of protection covered by this
section.
Undisclosed information must satisfy three conditions in order to be eligible
for protection under the TRIPS. The conditions all focus on the factor of secrecy: the
information is secret, has commercial value because of its secrecy and it is kept from
disclosure by its legitimate possessor.205 Additional specific conditions are required
for test data to be protected by the recipient authorities as undisclosed information.
The data must include new chemical entities resulting from considerable efforts. 206
Submission of such data to the authority upon its request is a prerequisite for granting
marketing approval.207 This means that information voluntarily submitted by the
possessor to the authorities could lose its protected status. Moreover, information that
is well known to the public is not eligible for protection. If conditions are met,
authorities are obliged to protect submitted data from unfair commercial use and
disclosure.208
The condition of secrecy is the sharpest difference between undisclosed
information and data exclusivity. Undisclosed information is the level of protection
provided by the TRIPS, while data exclusivity is adopted by most developed
countries. Data exclusivity does not require secrecy as the key factor for eligibility for
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protection. The TRIPS language provides the opportunity for members to issue
marketing approvals for generic versions of pharmaceuticals in cases where the
information about them is already disclosed. The central point for avoiding violations
of the TRIPS obligations is that the disclosure of submitted data is not made by the
recipient authority. Disclosure may take place away from the recipient authority as in
the case of reverse engineering performed outside of the country's territory. The
formulae of the generic versions could even be available on the internet or in medical
references. Where the legitimate possessor of the information claims that the recipient
authority has committed the disclosure, many legal systems would put the burden of
proof upon the claimant. Meanwhile, the TRIPS has not prohibited the authorities
from granting marketing approval based upon disclosed information. Notably, the
TRIPS does not specify any terms of protection for undisclosed information.
h. Enforcement of IPR
Enforcement is one of the most crucial contributions of the TRIPS to the
international IPR regime. It is one of the reasons why developed countries were so
keen to bring IPR under the umbrella of the WTO. In prior conventions and
agreements, enforcement provisions were either insufficient or even absent. Even
when they existed, the availability of an international enforcement mechanism was
still questionable. The WTO solved this problem by creating the Dispute Settlement
Body.
Enforcement provisions include criminal and civil remedies, and provisional
measures. They cover the various aspects needed to give respect to the levels of
protection prescribed in the previous part of the TRIPS. They also cover both
domestic markets and borders leaving no gaps for IPR infringement in the course of
trade. The presence of many optional enforcement measures in the TRIPS stems from
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its Article 1.1. This Article acknowledges the right of WTO members to apply the IPR
protection as mandated by the TRIPS in harmony with their own legal systems. The
variety of these legal systems is most diverse with respect to applying the law rather
than setting out its standards. Another component of the variety of members' legal
systems is that enforcement, unlike legislation, requires resource facilities that might
not always be affordable to developing and least developed countries. Accordingly,
each member has the right to enforce the agreed IPR protection standards of the
TRIPS within its own capacity and with full regard to its legal system.
The TRIPS drafters refrained from elaborating details of enforcement so as not
to complicate the applicability of its provisions. However, the TRIPS flexibility
regarding enforcement has generated heavy complaints among WTO members for non
- complying with the TRIPS provisions on enforcement. These complaints are due to
the fact that it is very hard for members to agree upon criteria for implementing the
TRIPS enforcement provisions. In the broadest sense, critics always complain about
insufficient efforts exerted by the criticized party to ensure enforcement. The latter in
turn responds with extensive reports about its continuous and rigorous efforts. If the
criticized party is a developing country member, it usually attributes the whole
enforcement problem to lack of resources. Discrediting the sufficiency of the technical
assistance programs provided by developed countries is also a defense by developing
countries.
i. Civil and Administrative Procedures and Remedies
The TRIPS gives heavier weight to the pursuit of civil remedies through
judicial rather than administrative authorities. Members are not supposed to follow a
predetermined set of detailed rules. Remedies are much more dependant on the
member's legal system. Members are only required to pay respect to some broad
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guidelines. Basically, all rights holders are entitled access to civil judicial procedures
to protect their rights.
Specifically, judicial authorities should have the right to order all parties of a
dispute to establish the required evidence on the merits of any case. 209 This obligation
does not discriminate between the status of any party.210 Authorities here have the
privilege of placing the burden of proof on any party. 211 Normally, the party that fails
to provide the authorities with the required evidence bears the consequences as the
losing party.212 The TRIPS even gives members the option of deciding a case solely on
the grounds of the content of the complaint, when the responding party does not
provide the refuting evidence.213
In addition, judicial authorities have the right to order injunctions aimed at
preventing the infringing party from its violations. 214 Injunctions cover all IPR
infringements, but with a special focus on released imported goods (trademarks) 215.
The rationale for this focus on domestic markets is further illustrated by the detailed
provisions on members' obligations to apply border enforcement measures. Intent of
infringement is a prerequisite for the injunction obligation to be mandatory to
members. The TRIPS gives members the option to exclude persons not knowing of
the existence of the infringement from such injunctions. 216 This is true even in case
where those persons possess or even have ordered the infringing products.217 Members
are free not to apply injunctions in cases of compulsory licenses. 218 Injunctions may be
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replaced by the adequate remuneration that would be paid to rights holders in such
cases.219
Members are obliged to authorize their judicial authorities to order the
infringing party to pay the right holder damages caused by the infringement. This is
only obligatory for members with respect to infringers who know about the existence
of the infringements.220 Otherwise, this obligation is optional to members.221 Another
optional measure for members is to order the infringer to pay for judicial expenses. 222
Confiscation or destruction of the infringing products or tools used predominantly in
the course of infringement is optional for judicial authorities223. Removal of the
infringing trademarks is not enough to permit the release of the product to domestic
markets.224 It is also optional for members to order the infringer to disclose any third
parties involved in producing or distributing the infringing products. 225 In all cases,
proportionality should always be maintained between the judicial orders or procedures
and the seriousness of the harms caused to the right holder.226
The defendant is entitled to indemnification if the allegation that he has
committed an IPR violation appears to be false. This indemnification shall be aimed at
compensating the defendant from both the damage and expenses accrued by the false
complaint.227 The TRIPS allows members only to exempt their judicial or
administrative authorities from paying such indemnification to the defendant for
damage caused by their decisions, if they did not intend to cause that damage. 228
Members have the right to implement any of the foregoing obligations by
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administrative rather than judicial procedures.229 This is only permissible in the TRIPS
as long as the same level of remedies is attained.230
ii. Provisional Measures
As in the case of civil remedies, the TRIPS obliges members to authorize their
judicial authorities to order provisional measures.231 Such measures aim at either
preventing an infringement or preserving evidence. Provisional measures can prevent
the circulation of released products from customs in the domestic market. 232 The
applicant must submit available evidence to support its request for the provisional
measures.233 At a further stage, the applicant must also submit all the required
evidence for the application to proceed.234 To prevent abuses, the applicant also has to
submit a security payment to the judicial authorities.235 This deposit can also be used
to compensate the defendant if the application is revoked or proven to be invalid.236
In urgent cases, judicial authorities have the authority to order provisional
measures without notifying the third party accused of infringement.237 The defendant
shall, however, be notified of the provisional orders as soon as possible. 238 Once
notified, the defendant has the right to be heard and to submit counter evidence that
the application for provisional measures submitted by the claimant is groundless. 239
The defendant also has the right to request the initiation of a case within a reasonable
period of time.240 This time can either be determined by the judicial authorities, or
else, will be 20 working or 31 calendar days. 241 Where the time limit is not met, the
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ordered measures are revoked.242 The defendant has the right of compensation in case
of revocation of the measures.243 As with other civil remedies, members may apply
administrative procedures when all the preceding obligations are fully met.244
iii. Border Measures
Members are obliged to apply border measures to prevent infringing products
from entering their domestic markets. Ironically, this issue of border measures is the
only one that can fairly be described as an international trade issue. Most other TRIPS
provisions deal with matters relevant to domestic jurisdictions. Border measures entail
the suspension of the release of the goods at the customs gates upon request of an
interested party.245 The measures are only mandatory with respect to importation. 246
Their application to exportation is left for each member to decide. 247 Members are not
obliged to apply border measures to goods in transit. 248 The nature of transit trade
requires expeditious procedures and the customs authorities have limited control.
Members are obliged to at least apply the measures to trademarks and
copyrights.249 Applying the measures to other forms of IPR remains optional for
members.250 Inspection of consignments containing products that are subject to IPR
protection is practical for these two forms. For example, it is hard to carry out border
inspections for patent infringement as it might require sophisticated technical facilities
(laboratories) and lengthy processes. The facilities might not be available for customs
authorities, while the long process could be detrimental to the flow of trade.
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The TRIPS encompasses some border measures that are similar to those of
provisional measures for domestic markets. In fact, TRIPS provisions on border
measures also provide for provisional measures but with a different scope of
application. Among these provisional measures are the ones concerning submission of
evidence including a detailed description of the infringed products. 251 The same is also
true with respect to payment of a security to prevent abuse of enforcement
measures.252 "Where the suspension application is approved, both the importer and the
applicant shall be notified promptly".253 The allowable duration of suspension is a
maximum of ten working days from the date of notifying the applicant of approval. 254
After this period, the suspended goods are released unless an interested party has
notified the customs of initiation of a legal case, or provisional measures are
ordered.255 The suspension period could be extended another ten days with approval
by the competent authority.256
The TRIPS obliges the applicant to pay all injured parties compensation for
harms caused by invalid applications.257 Beneficiaries could include the "importer, the
owner, or the consignee".258 This compensation would primarily be settled out of the
security deposited by the applicant. Additional amounts other than the security could
also be paid to make up for all the injuries.
Applicants and importers have equal rights to inspect the suspended goods. 259
Trade secrets must, nevertheless, be respected. 260 The TRIPS makes it optional for
members to provide the applicant with information concerning all parties involved in
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the infringement.261 This could happen if the applicant wins a case regarding the
substance of the application. The information could cover "names and addresses of the
importer, consignor and the consignee".262 The applicant could also be provided with
information about the quantity of the suspended goods.263
Members may also provide for ex officio actions by the competent authorities
to suspend goods suspected of prima facie infringements.264 In such a case, both the
importer and the right holder shall be promptly notified of the suspension. 265 The
competent authority may then ask the right holder to provide additional evidence in
support of the suspension.266 In the case of wrongful suspension, the competent
authorities alone may be exempted from the obligation to pay compensation for the
importer.267 This exemption applies in the case where the authorities had no deliberate
intention to harm the importer.268 However, this exemption must be handled
cautiously, as this ex officio action is subject to abuse.
The same procedures for disposing of the infringing goods out of domestic
markets are also to be adopted at the borders. Judicial authorities are required to order
the infringing goods to be either confiscated or destroyed. 269 The re-exportation of the
counterfeit goods is prohibited by the TRIPS, unless the infringement is removed. 270
De minimus imports for non - commercial use can be exempted from the application
of border measures. However, the TRIPS does not specify the exact amount of this de
minimus level.
iv. Criminal Remedies
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Criminal remedies are left to be determined by the legal system of each
member. The intangible benchmark for such remedies is that they serve as a deterrent
to IPR infringement.271 Members are free to limit the application of such remedies to
trademarks and copyrights.272 The application of criminal remedies to other forms of
IPR is only optional for members.273 Expansion of those remedies to other forms is
suggested by the TRIPS wording where bad faith and commercial scale infringement
occur.274 The remedies could be either imprisonment and/or monetary fines. 275
Infringing goods must be disposed out of the market by "seizure, forfeiture or
destruction of the goods".276 This disposal must also be done to tools predominantly
assigned to the infringement process.277
B. Bilateral Treaties
Egypt is a party of both the Association Agreement with the European
Communities278and the free trade agreement with the EFTA Group. 279 Both
agreements have very few IPR commitments compared to those endorsed by the
multilateral treaties. The only TRIPS Plus provisions that occur in both agreements
are those obliging their parties to accede to a number of IPR treaties, predominantly
belonging to the WIPO. This outcome is the result of the Egyptian reluctance to
accept further IPR obligations. This policy is influenced by the view that IPR may be
271
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a burden rather than a factor of attraction of foreign investors to the Egyptian market.
In all cases, both agreements, compared to the U.S. FTAs, include very few IPR
obligations. This is because the European Continent has other interests in Egypt, like
trade in agricultural goods and combating illegal immigration.

III. Egypt's Compliance with its International IPR Obligations
A. Introduction to the Egyptian IPR Law
Amending national laws and regulations is an explicit TRIPS obligation that is
to be carried out within one year of entry into force of the Agreement. This period was
extended to the year 2000 for developing countries, but the Law was delayed by two
years due to its onerous preparatory process. Egypt was thus obligated to have issued
its IPR Law by the year 2000. However, Egypt finally complied with its international
IPR obligations by issuing its new IPR Law in 2002. 280 This Law was mainly drafted
to endorse all measures of the TRIPS Agreement.
The 2002 Law replaces former IPR laws, namely, the Trademarks Law of
1939, the Patents Law of 1949 and the Copyrights Law of 1954. The Law is divided
into four Books.281 Book 1 covers patents, utility models, layout designs for integrated
circuits and undisclosed information. Book 2 covers trademarks, geographical
280
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indications and, industrial designs and models. Book 3 covers copyrights and related
rights. Book 4 covers new plant varieties. The main question is the level of standards
embodied by the new Law, and whether it complies with the TRIPS or also includes
TRIPS Plus provisions. The TRIPS only provides a set of minimum standards of IPR
protection that have to be respected by all WTO members. Adoption of additional
levels of IPR protection is left to the freedom of each member. However, it is not
acceptable to provide less than the TRIPS level of protection.
In fact, the Law not only complies with the TRIPS measures, it also includes
provisions to meet standards of other IPR treaties where Egypt is a member. For
example, the TRIPS does not include any provisions concerning the relationship
between patents, and the rules governing access to genetic resources and associated
traditional knowledge as provided by the CBD282. This issue is still stuck in
negotiations in the TRIPS Council. However, the Egyptian Law complies with the
CBD by directly linking patentability to disclosure of genetic resources and associated
traditional knowledge. This link is made in compliance with Egyptian obligations
under both the TRIPS and the CBD, and according to the Egyptian interpretation of
their provisions. The Law thus complies with the CBD regardless of the results of the
negotiations in the TRIPS Council on this issue.
In addition, Egypt is currently in the final stage of its accession to the
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). 283 Amendments to
Book 4 to make it comply fully with the UPOV are currently being considered by the
Government of Egypt. Notably, the TRIPS obliges the WTO members only to protect
new plant varieties by any adequate approach. Accession to a particular international
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treaty on the protection of new plant varieties is not obligatory under the TRIPS. This
particular obligation to accede to the UPOV emanates from the Association
Agreement and the FTA with the EFTA Group.
The Law also includes provisions that account for any future IPR
developments, like the protection of copyright and related rights on the internet. This
newly emerging area of copyright is not covered by the TRIPS, which was drafted at a
time where many developing and least developed countries lacked sufficient technical
and human capacities to deal with internet related issues. It was thus impossible to
require these countries to be multilaterally committed to offering protection in this
highly technical area. The most prominent international treaties in this new area are
the WIPO Internet Treaties known as the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).284 Egypt is not yet a member in
either of those two treaties as this membership is not required by the TRIPS. However,
the Egyptian legislature drafted the Law in a manner that would make Egypt ready for
acceding to these two Treaties.
However, the Law has been subject to strong criticism from several developed
countries. The U.S vigorously criticizes the Law, primarily in its USTR annual
reports. The U.S. has raised its criticism through numerous unilateral, bilateral and
multilateral channels. The grounds of this criticism vary from non compliance with
the TRIPS to non – conformity with the U.S. IPR standards. The legal validity of the
criticism depends on its reasons. In regard to the accusation of non compliance to the
TRIPS, Egypt finds itself in an embarrassing situation. In contrast, Egypt strongly
rejects the criticism founded on the U.S. standards. In all cases, the U.S. criticism
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signals Egypt's ineligibility for an FTA unless substantive legal reform is carried out,
especially in areas of concern for the U.S.
B. U.S. Unilateral Criticism of Egypt's Compliance with International IPR
Obligations
The importance of this section for the objectives of this paper is that it
determines whether Egypt is legally eligible to join an FTA with the U.S. If the
Egyptian IP Law is fully compliant with only its international obligations, then the
next matter is to examine Egypt's eligibility to join the FTA. If Egypt is not complying
with its current obligations, then points of deficiency in the Law should be highlighted
first, before it considers the adoption of TRIPS Plus measures. Such points of
deficiency must be evaluated in proportion to their significance in terms of trading
partners' interests. This significance may depend upon the assertiveness of demands
by these trading partners. For example, the Law has already many TRIPS Plus
measures like raising the term of protection for trademarks to ten years instead of
seven as required by the TRIPS. Another example of the TRIPS Plus in the Law is
raising priority rights for trademarks to one year instead of six months as required by
the Paris Convention. However, developed countries like the U.S. are not very
interested in these TRIPS Plus measures endorsed by the Law. The U.S. would prefer
Egypt's adoption of data exclusivity instead of undisclosed information.
Therefore, this section explains mainstream international criticism of IPR
protection in Egypt in terms of legality and enforceability. Special attention must be
given to criticism raised by the U.S., since its FTAs provide the most sophisticated
TRIPS Plus measures at the international level. In addition, Egypt has not yet joined
an FTA with the U.S. It may thus be useful to examine Egypt's conformity with the
U.S. rather than countries like the E.C that are taken for granted as Egypt's bilateral
trading partners.
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Criticism from the U.S. takes several forms, the most significant of which may
be found in the official annual reports issued by the USTR, the main U.S. body
concerned and authorized with proclaiming FTAs.285 The USTR annual reports
negatively categorize various countries in terms of their deficiencies in IPR protection.
Those reports are also collective in terms of gathering all USTR comments for all
countries in a single report. The key USTR reports are Section 301 and the National
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. Those reports are partially inspired
by the annual reports issued by the IIPA.286 The IIPA is a coalition of U.S. copyright
holders and it issues its annual reports per each country accused of copyright
infringements including Egypt.
1. The USTR Report
a. Section 301
Section 301 Reports for Egypt considered by this paper date from 2002 to
2007. Earlier reports are insignificant to this research as they were issued prior to the
new Egyptian IPR Law.287 The 2002 Report urged Egypt to expeditiously issue the
Law and to make some modifications to its drafts that were being publicly
considered.288 The 2002 Report listed Egypt at the "Priority Watch List" which implies
serious deficiencies in IPR protection.289
The 2003 Report elevated Egypt to the "Watch List". 290 This improvement of
Egypt's classification came as the U.S. was then gratified by the issuance of the Law,
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as well as, Egypt's ratification of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).291 Enforcement
efforts by Egypt to combat copyright piracy were also praised. 292 However, the U.S.
was dissatisfied with some of the Law provisions like those covering the protection of
undisclosed information, as it expected the application of the data exclusivity
instead.293 The Government of Egypt was encouraged to consider the inclusion of data
exclusivity in the Executive Regulations of the Law that had not yet been released.294
The classification of Egypt deteriorated in the 2004 Report.295 In this Report,
Egypt was downgraded back to the "Priority Watch List". 296 The main reason for the
downgrade was the issuance of marketing approvals for generic versions of U.S.
patented pharmaceuticals.297 The U.S. considered these marketing approvals as
violations of its patents registered in its territory, as Egypt was still under the
transitional period prescribed by the TRIPS for developing countries to grant such
patents by the year 2005.298 Direct reference to this violation of the TRIPS was
deliberately avoided, since Egypt was not yet obliged under the TRIPS to provide
patents for final products of pharmaceuticals. The principle of territoriality requires
that registered patents are by no means obligatory or enforceable outside the country
of registration. The US criticism was founded on a mixed TRIPS and TRIPS Plus
grounds. The U.S also expressed frustration with the delay in issuing the Executive
Regulations for Book 3 of the Law covering copyrights and related rights. 299 The U.S.
had another concern about the deficiency in copyright enforcement in Egypt.300
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The 2005 Report maintained Egypt on the "Priority Watch List", alleging
violations by the Egyptian Ministry of Health and Population of its TRIPS obligations
to protect test data from unfair commercial use. 301 The Report did not mention the fact
that this obligation is limited by a series of conditions including the secrecy of the
submitted data. The Report was made with the aim of pressuring Egypt to apply
TRIPS Plus measures. The U.S. also sought a new requirement: coordination between
the Ministry of Health and the Patent before granting marketing approvals for
pharmaceuticals.302 The U.S. was still dissatisfied with enforcement in other fields of
copyrights like software and books.303 However, improvements in copyright
enforcement for musical works were noted.304
The 2006 report repeated most of the contents of its predecessor. 305 This
repetition included complaints about protection of test data and enforcement of
copyrights. Egypt remained on the "Priority Watch List". 306 Some positive changes
like the issuance of the Executive Regulations for Copyrights and the Law of
Importation and Exportation covering border measures for IPR, were noted. 307 The
latter Law closed a serious loophole in the Egyptian legal system that had not
provided for border measures as required by the TRIPS. Such improvements were still
insufficient, thus the U.S. began to demand more explicitly the application of TRIPS
Plus like the accession to the WIPO Internet Treaties. 308 Such Treaties provide TRIPS
Plus measures for the protection of copyrights on the internet.
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Finally, the 2007 Report continued Egypt's status on the "Priority Watch
List".309 This report of 2007 provides insight into the U.S. judgment of the current
state of the IPR protection in Egypt. The only difference from the preceding reports
was the addition of a request for Egypt to apply border measures to goods in transit. 310
This TRIPS Plus request is a common denominator in all of the U.S. FTAs. The U.S.
was probably encouraged by the issuance of the Egyptian border measure regulations
through a ministerial decree (Minister of trade and Industry). Further amendments of
the Regulations are easy to make as they fall under the competency of a minister.
Thus, the complexities of presenting the amendments required by the USTR to the
Egyptian Parliament (The People's Assembly) could be avoided.
b. USTR National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers311
This annual report is more comprehensive than the Section 301 Report. Those
NTE reports issued prior to 2003, focused on the pending IPR Law. 312 Those early
reports were critical about the delay in the issuance of the Law, in addition to other
procedural issues concerning patents, trademarks and undisclosed information. Since
2003, the NTE comments were directed at the newly issued IPR Law. The 2003 report
claimed that Egypt's new Law did not comply with its commitments under the TRIPS
to protect "confidential test data".313 The Section 301 report remarks that Egypt
granted marketing approvals for generic versions of patented U.S. pharmaceuticals
309
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were reiterated.314 The U.S. once again refused to acknowledge the fact that Egypt was
not obliged at that point to grant patents for final products of pharmaceuticals. The
Report also included U.S. complaints about enforcement in the area of copyright. 315
Similar complaints existed for trademarks and industrial designs.316
The 2004 NTE Report included similar comments. But it altered its approach
to strategic criticism of test data protection. It claimed that Egypt violates its own laws
concerning data exclusivity.317 The fact is that the Egyptian Law does not refer to the
terminology of data exclusivity. The Law rather adopts the same concept of the TRIPS
Agreement of the protection of undisclosed information.318
The 2005 Report emphasized the worsening situation for the protection of test
data.319 It also introduced new comments concerning the protection of new plant
varieties.320 The U.S. accused the Ministry of Agriculture of being unable to register
any new plant variety till December 2004, due to the onerous procedures required by
the IPR Law.321 The biggest procedural concern was the requirement that the applicant
must deposit a sample of its new variety with the Egyptian Bank of Genes. 322 This
requirement is accompanied by the disclosure of the genetic resources or traditional
knowledge associated with this new variety. 323 The U.S. breeders have been refraining
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from exporting their new varieties to Egypt because of such concerns, fearing that
their breeds would be exposed to piracy.324
The granting of marketing approval of generic drugs continued in Egypt. 325
The 2006 Report added new dimensions to previous U.S. complaints about the
protection of test data.326 The new element was that some of the approvals affected
pending patent applications filed with the Egyptian Patent Office. 327 This problem was
aggravated by the prolonged patent approval procedures.328 An interim alternative to
patents is exclusive marketing rights provided by both the TRIPS and the Egyptian
Law.329 A U.S. pharmaceutical company was denied such exclusive marketing rights
by an Egyptian court.330 The Report raised more comments about the substance of the
Law itself rather than its implementation.331 It mentioned that the Law does not
provide for the exclusive commercial rights conferred to trademarks owners according
to the TRIPS.332 The Law only referred to these rights in the context of the exhaustion
of trademarks rights.333 This is a peculiar type of legal drafting of denying or
terminating rights that were never stipulated by the Law. Other concerns were raised
in the Report about the absence of the additional level of geographical indications
protection granted by the TRIPS to wines and spirits. 334 The only level that is provided
by the Law is the initial level, which protects the GIs to the extent that the public is
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not misled about the true origin of the good.335 The 2007 Report was almost the same
as its predecessor.336

2. The IIPA Annual Reports
The IIPA reports help inform about of the USTR judgment of IPR protection
in various countries. The 2003 IIPA Report included direct criticism of the Egyptian
IPR Law337. Later reports just reiterated the basic content of that of in 2003 Report. 338
For example, the Report stated that the criminal penalties for copyright infringements
are derived from those stipulated by the former copyright law of 1954.339 The penalties
in the Law range from 5000 to 10000 L.E. and/or a minimum period of imprisonment
of one month.340 This penalty lags behind the TRIPS objective of criminal remedies to
provide deterrence to IPR violations.341 The fines should be proportionate to the size
of business involved, while the fixed financial penalties of the Law only put a ceiling
on the damage inflicted by the infringer.342
The Law also enables the judicial authorities to seize materials that are fully
assigned to the act of copyright infringement. 343 This requirement contradicts the
335
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TRIPS which requires the seizure of the implements and materials that are
predominantly used in infringement.344 The Law allows judicial authorities to order a
custodian to make use of the disputed copyrighted works, with revenues deposited at
the court till the case is judicially decided. 345 This provision contradicts the TRIPS
obligation that the seized products shall be disposed outside of the market.346
The right of translation into Arabic lapses under the Law if the copyright
owner doesn't make within three years from the date of publication. 347 Egypt has no
right to make this exception to the right of translation under the Berne Convention
since it didn't fulfill the requirement of notifying the WIPO first.348 The limited
exceptions to copyrights under the Law don't provide for the three step conditions
stated in the TRIPS.349 The three conditions were only stated in the Law for one
particular exception to copyrights, making a personal copy.350 The conditions should
have been located at the "Chapeau" of the whole provision covering these limited
exceptions.351 The interests of the copyright owner could thus be jeopardized by a
broad interpretation of the Law by the courts which might approve seriously
infringing acts.352
The Law also enables broadcasting organizations to broadcast publicly
performed works as long as an adequate remuneration is paid to the author. 353 This
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payment could be "in cash or in kind".354 IIPA requests that "this provision provides a
compulsory license and should be deleted". 355 Another peculiar aspect of this
provision of the Law is that it doesn’t refer to an equivalent remuneration to be paid to
the performers.356 This is despite the fact that the Law refers to other types of
remunerations that should be also paid if necessary.357 A better wording in the Law
would have referred directly to the performers' remunerations.358
C. Criticism Raised by the U.S. against Egypt in the WTO Trade Policy Review
WTO members are subject to periodic reviews of their trade policies in all
economic fields including IPR. Such reviews are carried out by the WTO Secretariat
under the "Trade Policy Review Mechanism".359 A different time frequency for the
reviews is assigned for each of the WTO members according to its share in
international trade.360 For Egypt, this review takes place every six years.361 Part of this
review takes the form of an exchange of questions and replies between Egypt and its
main trading partners.362
Certainly, all questions pertaining to IPR in the trade policy review are posed
by developed countries like the U.S. The particular importance of examining the
questions raised by the U.S. is that they give indications about its areas of concern
about IPR protection in Egypt. The U.S. raised IPR questions in the Trade Policy
Review of Egypt, which cover the same issues raised at the bilateral level.363 The
354
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repeated questions included areas of data exclusivity, exceptions of copyrights, rights
conferred by trademarks, and enforcement of IPR.364 The only additional question was
about the exceptions of patentability under the Egyptian IPR Law.365 The U.S. was
concerned about the exception of "organs, tissues, viable cells and DNA" from
patentability.366 Egypt replied that these areas are interrelated with the areas exempted
from patentability under the TRIPS, like plants and animals.367 The Egyptian argument
was that if the whole animal or plant is exempted, then its cells are subject to the same
rule.368 Moreover, Egypt referred to other ethical and religious factors preventing the
grant of patents to these areas.369
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IV. A comparison of Egypt's IPR Law with IPR Standards in the U.S.
FTAs
The critical point of this thesis is a comparison of the Egyptian IPR Law with
the U.S. FTAs. There are many divergences in the different U.S. FTAs terms with
different countries regarding substantive standards and language. Still, it is possible to
compare the common denominators.
However, one must decide whether the comparison should be made between
the Egyptian IP Law and the U.S. FTAs with low or high TRIPS Plus standards. The
specific FTAs terms that will be the appropriate point for comparison are unknown till
the negotiations are launched between Egypt and the U.S. The start of negotiations
will reveal the significant interests motivating the two countries. A general trade
negotiation rule is that later negotiated agreements are more difficult for the weaker
party. This is obvious from all WTO accessions in all international trade files
including IPR. Accordingly, the U.S. is more likely to request high IPR standards in
the FTA negotiations with Egypt.
The focus of this comparison of the US FTAs is with countries sharing
common economic conditions with Egypt. Levels of economic status vary widely
among developing countries. Guiding factors for the similarity of economic conditions
of a given country and Egypt might include population, income per capita and
unemployment rate. The more socially vulnerable a country is, the less it is able to
accept TRIP Plus provisions. This rule applies despite all counter arguments
suggesting that adequate and effective IPR protection is a prerequisite to investment
promotion and economic growth.
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The US FTA with Morocco furnishes a good platform for comparison.
Morocco like Egypt has a relatively large population, with World Bank country data
for the year 2005 indicating the Moroccan population to be 30.2 million compared to
74 in Egypt.370 GNI per capita in 2005 was 1730 annually for Morocco and 1250 for
Egypt.371 The closeness of the GNI figures indicates Egypt's potential to accept the
TRIPS Plus measures. Moreover, the Morocco FTA would be likely to be used by the
US as a template since it has been used almost exactly in other FTAs with countries
such as Bahrain and Oman.
A. Gaps in IPR Standards between the U.S. FTAs and the Egyptian IPR Law
1. Trademarks
a. Eligibility for Registration
The FTAs require more legal levels regarding trademarks distinctiveness than
the visual perception criterion that is stipulated by the TRIPS. 372 FTA parties are
obliged to approve registration of peculiar types of trademarks like sound and smell of
the mark.373 The TRIPS is flexible enough in this regard as it is optional for members
to choose whether to apply the visual perception criterion as prerequisite for
trademark registration or not.374 TRIPS gives WTO members the option of requiring
the registration of trademarks to be contingent upon use or not. 375 In fact, the current
Egyptian Law makes use of the TRIPS. In defining trademarks, the Law lists a
number of examples such as names, colors and numbers or combinations thereof.376
370

Egypt, Arab Rep. Data Profile, available at:
http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=EGY and Morocco Data
Profile, available at: http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=MAR
(last visited April 1, 2008).
371
Id.
372
US – Morocco Free Trade Agreement, June 15, 2004, available at:
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_Text/Section Index.html (last
visited April. 3, 2008), Article 15.2.1 & TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 15.
373
US – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.2.1.
374
TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 15.1.
375
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 63.
376
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 63

60

The definition is succeeded by a condition that all types of trademarks must be
visually perceptive.377 The Law also links ownership of trademarks to use within five
years from the registration date.378 Otherwise, competent courts are entitled to cancel
the registration upon the request of any interested party.379 The owner may still request
the restoration of this cancelled registration within three years in exchange for an
additional formality and according to the same requirements of the initial
registration.380 Restoration is always feasible unless the cancellation is the outcome of
a judicial decision.381
b. Rights Conferred to Trademarks Owners
The FTAs extended rights conferred to trademark owners under the TRIPS.
The TRIPS grants such rights with respect to identical or similar signs for identical or
similar goods or services.382 The FTAs oblige their parties to apply the trademark
classifications of the WIPO Nice Agreement. 383 These classifications prescribed by the
Nice Agreement put trademarks assigning different goods or services into interrelated
groupings. However, the FTAs extend trademark rights to "related goods or services",
which is beyond the Nice classifications.384 This extension reverses the objectives of
the Agreement as the registration of a trademark for one or more classifications will
be automatically extended to neighboring classifications. Egypt is already a member

377

The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 65.
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 65.
379
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 91.
380
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 92.
381
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 92
382
TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 16.1.
383
US – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.2.9.
384
World Intellectual Property Organization, Nice Agreement Concerning the International
Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, of June 15, 1957, as
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Geneva on May 13, 1977, and amended on September
28, 1979 (hereinafter Nice Agreement).
378

61

of the Nice Agreement385. The current practice in Egypt is that the registration is only
approved for classifications specified in the applications.

c. Intersection between Trademarks and Geographical Indications
The U.S. FTAs favor trademarks over geographical indications. In other
words, the intersectional relationship between trademarks and geographical
indications is transformed by the FTAs to an interchangeable one, in favor of the
former. This has been the consistent U.S. position in all international trade forums. In
WTO negotiations, the U.S. always opposes the E.C.'s attempts to upgrade the current
international level of GIs protection. The FTAs give trademark owners exclusive
rights preventing all third parties from commercially using their marks without their
consent.386 In the abstract, this condition is nothing more than what is already required
by the TRIPS.387 The prevalence of trademarks over GIs is only acknowledged by the
TRIPS in one of two cases: use prior to the TRIPS or lack of protection of the GI in
question in its country of origin.388 The only difference is that under the FTAs, the use
of GIs is subject to prevention by trademarks owners of similar or identical
products.389
Further, the FTAs are clear in exempting the common name from the
protection of GIs.390 The TRIPS avails WTO members of the possibility of exempting
customary names from GIs protection, which is the U.S. approach.391 To the contrary,
proponents of GIs usually choose to apply GIs to such customary names. 392 Many
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parties to FTAs belong to the so - called Old World. The element of accumulation of
the marketing reputation of a given good is necessary for a GI to develop in any
territory; this is only enjoyable by Old World countries. Rich biodiversity in a given
country along with the presence of large indigenous communities such as those in
Morocco are important elements that makes GIs more advantageous than trademarks.
The FTAs thus deprives Morocco of the advantages of its heritage which contributes
to its economic strength and well being.
New World countries such as the U.S., Canada and Australia, care less for the
protection of GIs. Accordingly, the U.S. FTAs deprive their Old World partners from
pursuing internal protection for their own customary names under the GIs system 393.
In addition, the definition of GIs under the TRIPS refers only to goods 394. Interested
members can choose to apply GIs to services as well 395. The U.S. FTAs are specific in
including GIs for services396. This inclusion of services provides trademark owners
with further advantages, thus promoting the U.S. FTAs' approach which favors
trademarks for all types of GIs, whether goods or services. The Egyptian Law is
deficient in GI provisions and its definition of GIs doesn't include services anyway,
therefore this point is irrelevant397.
d. E – Filing for Trademarks
E - filing is the most challenging TRIPS Plus requirement in the U.S. FTAs
regarding trademarks, as it requires advanced facilities often unavailable in
developing countries.398The FTAs mandate that their parties establish an e-filing
system for trademarks.
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and renewing of the trademarks. 400 In tandem, an online database is to be available to
the public presenting applications and registrations of trademarks submitted to the
competent authorities.401 This substantive requirement is already in place in Egypt
with the Commercial Registry thus satisfying the U.S. standards.
e. Recordation of Trademarks Licenses
The TRIPS grants WTO members the right to regulate licensing and
assignment of trademarks, as long as compulsory licenses are not involved. 402 In
contrast, the U.S. FTAs deny registration of trademark licenses as a prerequisite of
their legal validity.403 The Egyptian IPR Law requires, through elaborate provisions,
that all trademarks licenses be registered or else they will not be recognized.404
This registration requirement of the Egyptian IPR Law is included in its
Executive Regulations listing all data related to the licensing process. The registration
data includes all the information about the licenser and licensee. 405 The licenses are
non assignable except with consent of the owner.406 To this end, all the signatures
included in the licensing contracts need first to be judicially certified. 407 Registrability
can't be satisfied by registration of the licensing act itself. The registration must also
include an authentic copy of the contract.408
Like all trademarks legal transactions, registration must be published for
transparency reasons.409 The calculation of all terms of IPR protection commences
from the publication date.410 The same publication requirement is mandatory for all

400

U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.2.7.
U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.2.7.
402
TRIPS, supra note 2, at Article 21.
403
U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, at Article 15.2.11.
404
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 96.
405
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, Executive Regulations, at Article 102.
406
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 96.
407
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 96.
408
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, Executive Regulations, at Articles 102 – 103.
409
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 96.
410
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, at Article 96.
401

64

legal transactions. Accordingly, the legal effects of licensing contracts of trademarks
are in suspension till their publication.411
2. Geographical Indications
Countries adopt numerous individual approaches to the TRIPS definition of
GIs thus making it one of the most controversial IPR issues, since GIs are interrelated
with other concepts such as appellations of origin and false indications of sources. The
differences among these concepts are ill defined. That's why the U.S. FTAs do not
include extensive GIs provisions. The FTAs instead reiterate what is already
mentioned in their trademarks sections about the prevalence of trademarks over GIs
where conflict occurs. Additionally, the FTAs extend the GIs definition under the
TRIPS to include elements that are classically designated for identifying or defining
trademarks.412 For instance, the FTAs definition of GIs states that "any sign or
combination of signs including geographical and personal names shall be eligible to
be a geographical indication".413 Purportedly, this definition expands the scope of GIs,
but in reality, it strengthens the reach of trademark owners over GIs. As a practical
matter, this definition makes trademarks eligible for all privileges currently enjoyable
by GIs under the TRIPS while the converse is not true.
3. Copyright and Related Rights
a. Exclusive Rights of Reproduction
The U.S. FTAs grant holders of copyright and related rights the exclusive
rights to prevent all third parties from any sort of reproduction of protected works. 414
This prevention includes the act of making temporary copies in electronic forms
without the holder's consent.415 No specifications for computer programs are
411
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mentioned in the FTAs.416 Accordingly, the prevention clause extends to all types of
reproductions.417 The Egyptian IPR Law, in turn, endorses a vast array of exceptions
that are frequently criticized by the U.S. Such exceptions include the making of single
and personal copies for some forms of literary or artistic works. 418 Temporary copies
of computer programs are also exempted by the Law, as long as they are being carried
out by a legal possessor.419
b. Exhaustion of Rights
Exhaustion of exclusive rights is usually included in developing countries' IPR
laws in order to offer the public alternative channels of distribution of copyrighted
works. The TRIPS is neutral with respect to exhaustion of IPR rights. It explicitly
mentions that its provisions do not prevent WTO members from the right to apply
exhaustion.420 This exhaustion may take place outside the territory of the member,
when the copyright owner transfers this right abroad. It is then presumed that the
original copies of this work are possessed legitimately abroad unless otherwise is
established by the owner. This owner can, in case of copyright infringement, request
the competent authorities to apply border measures to imported products. The FTAs
extend the exclusive rights of the copyright holders, by preventing the FTAs parties
from applying exhaustion to imports. In contrast, exhaustion is repeated in all sections
of the Egyptian Law including for copyright.421
c. Term of Protection
Extension of the term of copyright protection as prescribed by the TRIPS is a
common factor in most FTAs. This term is extended from 50 to 70 years computed
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from the author's death.422 This extension applies to all forms of copyright
indiscriminately, including works of applied arts.423 The protection of such applied
arts is limited by the Egyptian Law to 25 years from the date of publication or public
availability, whichever comes last.424 The FTAs apply the same extension of the term
of protection to performers and producers of phonograms.425
4. Patents
a. Scope of Patentability
Patent is one of the key IPR fields. The FTAs require higher levels of
protection than those provided by the TRIPS. The TRIPS offers WTO members some
optional exceptions from patentability in some sensitive fields of technology, or ordre
public concerns.426 The FTAs maintained only the latter exceptions. 427 Exceptions
from patentability are restricted by the FTAs to "protect the ordre public or morality,
including human, animal, or plant life or health, or to avoid serious prejudice to the
environment".428 This exception is unavoidable even by the most zealous IPR
demandeurs like the U.S.429 This area of exceptions is a matter of serious sensitivity
aligning most developing countries in their concerns about boundaries for
patentability.
The same is not true for other areas acknowledged by the TRIPS to be
sensitive, with patentability left to the choice of each member. 430 The FTAs are silent
about excluding these areas like "diagnostic, therapeutic or surgical methods for
humans or animals" from patentability.431 Accordingly, parties of the FTAs are
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obliged to offer patents in these areas and to cease availing themselves of the TRIPS
options in this regard.432 The FTAs explicitly extend this patent obligation to even
more controversial areas like plants and animals.433
b. Limitations to Patent Rights
The FTAs provide that the patent owner has exclusive rights that are unlimited
by the principle of exhaustion.434 In this context, the FTAs state that those rights, in
particular with respect to importation, are not impaired by the act of selling the
patented product abroad by the patent owner.435 Importation of the patented products
by third parties would thus always require the consent of the owner.436 The Egyptian
Law has made use of exhaustion as granted by the TRIPS to WTO members. 437 The
Law states that "the owner's right to prevent third parties from importing, using,
selling or distributing a product shall lapse when he commercializes the product in any
country or authorizes a third party to do so".438
c. Term of Patent Protection
Patents is one of the most frequent fields for imposing TRIPS Plus measures in
the FTAs. The TRIPS provides only a term of patent protection of twenty years
computed from the filing date.439 FTAs negotiators have not managed to increase the
term of protection in normal circumstances. Instead, if an unreasonable delay occurs
in the process of patent application, the FTAs grant the owner a compensatory term of
protection.440 The owner is only entitled to this compensation if the delay is not his
fault. For instance, the right holder has no privilege to this compensatory term if the
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cause of delay is unfurnished documentation from his side.441 The FTAs define this
delay to be a period of "more than four years from the filing date or two years from
the request of examination of the application, whichever, lasts longer". 442 This
compensation shall only be equal to the delay period. 443 For example, if the
application inspection takes five years from the filing date, the patent owner is
compensated for one year, making the overall net patent duration equal to sixteen
years. Moreover, the compensation is contingent on the request of an interested party,
like the patent owner.444 Thus, the competent authorities are not burdened by an ex
officio obligation under the FTAs to adjust the term of protection for the delays.445
The Egyptian Law, in contrast, does not include any such time compensation.
The interested party has only an opportunity to resort to the competent administrative
court to complain about unreasonably prolonged inspections of his patent application.
However, having the Law void of specific provisions about the time compensation
leaves the whole matter to the power of decision of the judge. This is disadvantageous
to the applicant because the Egyptian judge will seldom decide against an over burdened government authority like the Patent Office.
5. Measures Related to Certain Products
a. Data Exclusivity versus Undisclosed Information
This is the most controversial IPR issue and a serious hindrance to Egypt's
eligibility to join an FTA with the U.S. As previously noted in chapter 3, the U.S.
criticism of the IPR protection in Egypt centers on this issue. In fact, the FTAs'
provisions are drafted in a manner that avoids provoking the public opinion in
developing countries towards data exclusivity. The real heading of this part in the
441
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FTAs should have been the protection of data exclusivity. However, data exclusivity
is disguised in the FTAs under the heading "Measures Related to Certain Products".446
The vague wording of this heading in the FTAs does not really specify its scope of
application. This scope would have to be inferred from the context of the underlying
provisions, as the straightforward definition of the "certain products" is not provided
by the FTAs. The kind of protection offered or even the exact field of IPR under
which this part falls is deliberately avoided by the FTAs. Normally, international IPR
legal texts provide a specified terminology for any form of IPR they tackle. The
TRIPS calls this form of IPR "undisclosed information", while the U.S. legal system
and its reports use the term "data exclusivity". The Egyptian IPR Law adopts the term
undisclosed information and almost copycats its definition from the TRIPS.447
b. Rights Conferred by Data Exclusivity
The right conferred to owners of test data is the most controversial aspect of
data exclusivity. The FTAs grant applicants exclusivity of reference to their test data
in the course of marketing approval for pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals. 448
In other words, the owners are treated as first come first protected. A person must
submit such data upon request of the competent authority as a condition for getting the
marketing approval of his pharmaceutical product. Consequently, data exclusivity
gives him the right to prevent third parties from referring to his data to get their own
marketing approvals.449 This right also works even if such data is not confidential, or
is being published in publicly available official documents or websites. In this case,
third parties are obliged to submit their own data to get marketing approval. This data
is inspected for its efficacy and safety apart from the inspection that has already been
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carried out by the competent authority for the data submitted by the original person.
The net result of this process is redundancy in administrative costs and efforts, and
prolongation of time for approval for submitted data. All extra costs would be levied
on the third parties, who in turn, pass the costs on to the consumers. In some cases,
third parties' competitiveness is hampered by the additional time period for the new
inspections, and thus reducing product option for consumers.
The Egyptian Law has been decisive in preventing this redundancy of
procedures or costs of marketing approvals for pharmaceuticals. 450 It adopts the
conditions of the secrecy of data as provided for by the TRIPS. 451 Accordingly, if the
submitted data is publicly available, no exclusivity is granted to the initial submitter. 452
The FTAs are clear that exclusivity also applies to documents proving marketing
approval abroad.453 The strict application of undisclosed information is a significant
point of free riding for third parties marketing approval for pharmaceuticals in Egypt.
To elaborate, if the U.S. Food and Drug Administration or any other credible entity in
a developed country approves a certain drug, the Egyptian Ministry of Health would
probably accept the circulation of this drug in the Egyptian market. The outcome of
this procedural flexibility is enjoyed equally by both the initial submitter and third
parties. They are both exempted from some documentation requirements.
c. Term of Protection
The term of protection is specified by the FTAs, making use of the TRIPS
silence this regard454. The term under the FTAs is five years for pharmaceuticals and
ten years for agricultural chemicals, computed from the approval date. 455 This
computation trigger under the FTAs assures that the long administrative procedures do
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not affect the rights holders.456 The TRIPS does not include any provisions regulating
this computation process either.457
The Egyptian Law literally abides by the wording of the TRIPS on this issue to
comply with Egypt's international obligations without applying any TRIPS Plus
measures. In other areas where the TRIPS is not specific, like the term of protection,
the Law adopts a lower standard compared to the level of protection offered by the
FTAs. The Law provides five years of protection of undisclosed information
regardless, whether such data belong to pharmaceuticals or agricultural chemicals. 458
Computation starts from the date of submission or till such data are disclosed,
whichever comes first.459
The FTAs also provide for a compensatory period to the duration of the patent
in the case of unreasonable curtailment resulting from the marketing approval
process.460 However, there is no FTA definition of unreasonable curtailment or any
time limits for the competent authority to decide on marketing approval
applications.461 In practice, this time compensation is useless if the marketing approval
takes less time than that taken for patent approval. 462 In this case, the owner of the test
data will be granted the time compensation already determined by the FTAs for the
curtailment in patent procedures. A problem still exists if there is no such patent
curtailment, as it will be difficult to compute time compensation due to the curtailment
in the marketing approval procedures because of the lack of the FTA definition. The

456

U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note372, Article 15.10.1.
TRIPS, supra note 4, Article 39.
458
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, Article 56.
459
The Egyptian IPR Law, supra note 280, Article 56.
460
U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, Article 15.10.3.
461
U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, Article 15.10.3.
457

462

U.S. – Morocco FTA, supra note 372, Article 15.10.3.

72

Egyptian Law, as in the case for patent procedures, does not provide for any time
compensation of any kind.463
d. Linking Marketing Approval to Patents
The FTAs include provisions linking marketing approval to existing patents. 464
The absence of this link in Egypt is one of the frequent points of U.S. criticism against
IP protection in Egypt. This link should be made if a patent is still in force for the
same product that is the subject matter of a marketing approval application. 465 The
FTAs require that the competent authority prevent the applicant from marketing the
product till the patent lapses.466 Alternatively, an FTA party may allow for the
application of such marketing approvals, but the patent owner must be notified of the
applicant's identity.467
The Egyptian Law provides for measures that are not necessarily contradictory
to the wording of the FTAs but still are not fully compatible with their spirit. The
FTAs aim at limiting the practice of "the Bolar exemption". This practice allows third
parties to prepare for marketing approval for the patented product within the patent
duration, but the marketing itself should not start until after the protection expires. 468
The FTAs might also be targeting, without explicitly stating, the application of extra territorial jurisdiction for patents registered in the U.S. This is absolutely out of the
question under the Egyptian Law which only recognizes patents registered in the
Egyptian Patent Office.469

6. Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
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a. Enforcement of Copyright
The FTAs obligate their parties to apply enforcement measures to copyrights
and related rights regardless of their registration with the competent authorities. 470 The
entitlement to copyright or related right could thus be proven by any available
evidence, like the direct designation of the right holder's name on the product. 471 Other
sorts of evidence like licensing contracts could also be sufficient for the right holder to
be able to claim the right to protection for enforcement measures. In contrast, the
Egyptian Law requires the holders of copyrights and related rights to register their
products with the competent authorities. For all types of copyrights, the competent
authority is the Egyptian Ministry of the Culture, while the Ministry of Telecom is
responsible for computer programs and data bases.472 The Ministry of Media is only
responsible for the protection of broadcast organizations.473
b. Compensation under Civil Remedies
The FTAs adopt a system of damage calculation that is completely derived
from a U.S. legal system and that cannot be fitted to the Egyptian Civil law. Profits
gained by the infringer are considered by the FTAs in determining the amount of the
compensation.474 This profit consideration must occur for infringements of trademarks
and, copyrights and related rights.475 Those fields of IPR must also be protected by pre
- established damages.476 In case of patents, judicial authorities are authorized to raise
the amount of the compensation to at least triple the damage. 477 This damage may be
either proven or just assessed.478 The damages must also include the retail value of the
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product assigned to the infringed IPR.479 The consideration of both the profits and
retail values will lead to the duplication of the calculation process. Damages to be paid
by the infringer will thus be maximized, leading to stronger deterrence.
The Egyptian Legal system has not gone as far as the FTAs in punishing the
infringer. The amount payable in Egyptian IPR cases must be in harmony with other
violations of the law. The Egyptian IPR law provides for very few provisions of civil
remedies leaving the whole matter to the Civil Law. Obviously, the IPR Law
provisions in this regard are complementary to the remedies provided by the latter
Law.480 The most important contribution of the IPR Law to the civil remedies is that it
allows the judge to order the sale of goods infringing trademarks. 481 Civil remedies for
other forms of IPR infringement are not clear from the IPR Law. The revenue from
the selling process is not necessarily given to the right holder as a direct
compensation.482 Rather, this revenue will only cover all fines and compensations. 483
The principal amount of compensation ordered for the right holder under the civil
filing shall not be deemed to be subject to an increase generated by this revenue.
The Civil Law specifies the general principle for damage computation.484 This
principle adopts the right holder's interest as the standpoint for computing the
damages.485 The process of determination of the exact amount of the compensation is
left to the discretion of the judge. 486 The only guiding principle for the Egyptian judge
under the Civil Law is to take into consideration two factors: the damages and the
profit opportunity lost by the right holder. 487 It is worth mentioning that the holder's
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loss usually exceeds the profits taken by the infringer, because the whole rationale of
infringement in Egypt is to offer the public cheaper prices and lower quality. Egyptian
consumers tend to be more price than quality sensitive. The same applies in
considering the retail value of the product bearing the infringing IPR. It is usually but
not always, very cheap.
c. Destruction of Seized Goods
The FTAs limit the TRIPS options for dealing with seized goods to the act of
destruction.488 This destruction is to take place without compensation of any sort in
accordance with the TRIPS instructions.489 Other options provided by the TRIPS such
as the confiscation and disposal of the infringing goods outside the channels of
commerce are provided by the FTAs only ambiguously. 490 These other options are
only permitted by the FTAs under exceptional circumstances. 491 The FTAs provide
only for the option of confiscation of materials and implements used in the course of
infringement.492 The trademarks provisions in Egyptian IPR Law make use of all the
TRIPS Options for both the goods and associated materials and implements. 493 This
Egyptian system of confiscation is likely to be given more international consideration.
The act of destruction of goods bearing infringing trademarks has unpleasant
environmental costs that are not recognized as generally affordable. The copyright
provisions in the Law are less explicit as they only refer to confiscation. 494 Recycling
of copyright infringing goods is less likely, as the removal of the infringement is not
practically feasible in most cases.
d. Border Measures
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Border measures are one of the most common issues in any TRIPS Plus text,
as they provide for an enforcement efficiency that is not attainable in the domestic
market where infringing goods may be widely dispersed. The TRIPS offers a wide
range of options with respect to the scope of application of such border measures. 495
The FTAs require that border measures be applied either by the request of an
interested party or ex officio by the competent authorities.496 A security is to be paid by
the applicant for the application of such border measures.497 However, this security
shall not be burdensome to the extent that would "deter the right holders from
resorting to border measures".498 The measures are also applicable under the FTAs to
"importation, exportation and goods in transit".499
The Egyptian IPR Law is silent about the border measures, a matter of harsh
criticism by Egypt's trading partners from the developed world. However, in 2005,
Egypt endorsed border measures in the Executive Regulations for the Law of
Importation and Exportation, the Law no 118 for the Year 1975. 500 These Regulations
give the government great flexibility in deciding on the level of enforcement measures
applied at Egyptian borders. They are issued and amendable by a decree of the
Minister of Trade and Industry. The issuance of the Regulations relieved the concerns
of other countries like the U.S. about IPR enforcement in Egypt.
The current Egyptian Regulations fall short of the level presented by the FTAs.
For instance, Egypt does not apply border measures for exportation and transit, so as
not to burden its competent authorities with non mandatory measures. 501 Ex Officio
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application is also limited to receipt of a notification from other governmental
agency.502 This notification is to be proceeded by a complaint filed by the interested
party, after being promptly notified by the competent customs about the ex officio
procedures.503 In contrast, Egypt applies border measures to a wider range of IPR
forms than that required by the FTAs. It applies the measures to patents, layout
designs for integrated circuits and industrial designs, while the FTAs only cover
trademarks and, copyrights and related rights.504 However, this detailing in the
Egyptian Regulations is of little practical value. All the additional IPR forms in the
Egyptian Regulations, except the industrial designs, require laboratory inspection that
is not available for the customs facilities. A border complaint for a patent violation is
to be diverted to the Patent Office, where it will be moved through a long procedure
for decision making. The U.S. will thus be less interested in this addition by Egypt,
favoring the application of its FTAs standards.

V. Policy Concerns and Conclusions
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A. Policy Concerns Regarding Elevating the IPR Protection Standards to Those
Endorsed by the U.S. FTAs
1. Overview
This chapter examines policy concerns that would currently prevent Egypt
from accepting TRIPS Plus provisions. Chapter 4 served to highlight the legal
differences between the TRIPS Plus provisions in the U.S. FTAs and the Egyptian
IPR Law. However, policy issues preventing Egypt's adoption of the TRIPS Plus
aren't necessarily evident from the legal comparison. A country formulates its policy
first then it promulgates the implementing law. Countries go into international trade
negotiations with policy priorities. Some of the points they hope to keep non
negotiable while some other areas are open for tradeoffs. A country might be
successful in accomplishing all of its policy priorities or it could lose some of them in
the course of negotiations. The key question remains: which compromises would be
problematic for the vital areas of policy of a country?
The level of development in a given country will define its areas of sensitivity.
Those areas need to be protected from any substantive compromises. For a developing
country, sensitivity problems will emanate from concerns for social and economic
vulnerability. These problems are usually shared by countries at the similar levels of
development. Reports issued by international organizations, such as the World Health
Organization (WHO), address TRIPS Plus in general and possible policy problems for
the protection of public health in developing countries505. If a specific country is
mentioned in a WHO report, the conclusion usually applies to other developing
countries as well. For a developed country, industry lobbying pressures might prohibit
changes by any administration or political party seeking reelection. Such pressures
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may prevent the conclusion of an FTA in the first place, where the interested lobbies
are sufficiently influential in legislative bodies.
2. Policy Concerns for Specific IPR Forms
a. Geographical Indications
The U.S. favors trademarks over GIs in its FTAs as was pointed out by VivasEugui and Spennemann506. Other IPR areas like patents for pharmaceuticals and
copyrights for software and entertainment are of even more importance to the U.S.507
In the instance of GIs, the U.S. uses the TRIPS flexibility to implement its obligations
through its trademark laws.508 However, some U.S. agricultural interests like the "Napa
valley producers", have begun requesting U.S. positions that are more favorable

towards GIs.509 Thus far, these parties with GI interests have not been influential in the
U.S. IPR policy making process.
The U.S. position stems from the logical argument that GIs are public
designations, while IPR deals with private rights.510 In the context where GIs intersect
with an IPR, trademarks are the preferred option as illustrated by the FTAs.511 Here
the U.S. places GIs on the same footing as trademarks.512 This practice is commonly
known as “first in time, first in right”.513 This means that a trademark could be given
priority over a GI if applied first.514 A counter argument could be that GIs develop by
accumulation through generations, and thus should be offered priority.515
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This area is not one of great policy concern to Egypt, as it has already
incorporated GIs in its IPR Law under the trademarks provisions. An outstanding
problem is that this Law does not include the additional level of protection currently
granted for wines and spirits, pursuant to Articles 23 – 24 of the TRIPS. A TRIPS
Minus Law would make a country ineligible to join an FTA with the U.S. This is even
true in areas of little interest for the U.S like GIs. Recognizing a TRIPS deficient legal
system and concluding an FTA with Egypt could potentially embarrass the U.S.
government before its public. The U.S. cannot afford to forgo any opportunity to
pressure Egypt into compliance with its international IPR obligations and thus open
the door to further legal enhancements in areas such as data exclusivity.
b. Copyright and Related Rights
One critical policy issue of the FTAs is the prohibition of parallel importation
even if the right holder has already sold its product abroad. Third parties cannot then
import such legitimately acquired products from abroad, unless they have the holder's
consent. Abbott explains that the issue of parallel importation is not covered by U.S.
case law.516 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed only the exhaustion of copyright for the
first sale inside the U.S.517 The texts of the FTAs, which are binding to the U.S. courts,
have now become complementary on the issue of exhaustion by prohibiting parallel
importation.518
In contrast, Egypt enables exhaustion in copyrights and related rights, for both
selling inside its territory and abroad. Egyptian IPR legislators want to provide
consumers with wider varieties of prices offered by parallel importation. This may
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lead to the availability of the copyrighted works at cheaper prices in Egypt. This can
happen if the right holder has already sold his work in a country with a more cost
efficient capacity. Egypt may also be able to advantageously compare prices among
several countries if the copyright holder has authorized publication in all of them.
Accordingly, there is little chance that Egyptian policy makers would be ready to
sacrifice such an advantage. The only exception would be if all key areas of
copyrights are adequately covered by distribution agreements between the right
holders and Egypt at reduced prices. This would make parallel importation of minimal
significance for Egypt, which is not yet the case.
c. Patents
TRIPS Plus patent provisions constitute serious threats to public health
protection efforts in developing countries, and thus cannot be accepted by Egypt.
Berger and Prabhala point out that FTAs favor patent holders, even beyond their
initial expectations when they acquired their exclusive patent rights.519 This happens
because the scope of patentability is extended to areas that were not included under
the patent when the patent holders applied for their patents.520 The same fact is true of
even more essential areas like "fixed-dose combination (FDC)".521 This kind of
treatment relies of new combinations of existing pharmaceuticals.522 Such
combinations are now patentable under the FTAs as therapeutic methods.523
FTAs also prohibit parallel importation of patented products. This prohibition
of parallel importation limits price options in developing countries.524 Another
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problem of this prohibition is that it overrides, in practice, the results of the difficult
WTO negotiations on the "Relationship between the TRIPS and Public Health".525 In
these negotiations, developing countries managed to get the approval from their
developed trading partners to provide more TRIPS flexibilities.526 Such flexibilities
enabled countries, without capacity or with insufficient capacity in their
pharmaceuticals industry, to import patented products produced under the compulsory
licensing system.527 Applying the FTAs prohibition to parallel importation prevents
developing countries from using the TRIPS flexibilities to get pharmaceuticals
supplies.528 To the contrary, Egypt's IPR Law grants parallel importation thus creating
another problem that needs to be resolved.
Revocation of patents is limited under the FTAs to the same reasons that
would justify the refusal of the original patent application.529 Grounds for refusal are
usually founded on insufficiency of the patent conditions or misrepresentation of
information by the applicant. Article 5(A)(3) of the Paris Convention enables
revocation of patents if the compulsory licensing is insufficient.530 This would
normally occur in cases of abuse of the patent by its holder.531 The revocation of the
patent would still enable the holder to use the formerly patented product, but without
exclusivity.532 Therefore, this limits the options for developing countries if abuse of
the patents rights occurs.533 The Egyptian IPR Law does not accept this limitation, as it
endorses the revocation options offered by both the TRIPS and Paris Convention.534 A
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further aspect is that the Law allows expropriation of patents with relatively flexible
conditions.535
Linking patents to marketing approvals for pharmaceuticals is a big challenge to
developing countries as it requires sophisticated database facilities.536 This link, as
required by the FTAs, would oblige the authority which issues marketing approvals to
confirm whether the product of concern is patented.537 This cross checking process
aims to prevent the issuance of marketing approval for non - patent holders.538 The
problem with this issue is that the status of the patent tends to be dynamic in terms of
its termination or additions.539 An equivalently dynamic patent database must be
available for developing countries to be able to comply with such an obligation.
Another limitation is the one concerning the suspension of the Bolar Provision if this
link is applied. This Provision allows third parties to prepare for marketing approval
during the patent duration. However, they cannot start marketing the patented product
except after the lapse of the patent period.
The Egyptian Law acknowledges none of the above mentioned TRIPS Plus
aspects. The language of the Law on patents is drafted to make maximum use of the
TRIPS flexibilities. The main reason for this flexible language is to alleviate public
skepticism about the monopolistic effects of patents, and their consequences on prices.
Egyptian policy makers still adhere to negotiating positions that favor TRIPS
flexibilities. This is self - evident from the terms of Egypt's preferential agreements
with the E.C., EFTA and Turkey.
d. Data Exclusivity
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Egyptian policy makers are most wary of attempts by developed countries to
force Egypt to adopt the concept of data exclusivity instead of undisclosed
information. International reports strongly warn developing countries about the
negative effects of data exclusivity on access to medicines. The warning reports are
released by credible U.N. international organizations such as the WHO and the
UNCTAD.
For example, the WHO issues a series of reports under the name "WHO Policy
Perspectives on Medicines". The third report in the series explained that trade
liberalization can increase developing countries access to non - patented
pharmaceuticals.540 This would be the result of lowered tariffs on pharmaceuticals that
would definitely push down their prices.541 However, if the countries do not draft their
IPR laws properly they might not enjoy this advantage in pharmaceutical prices.542
Developing countries must be accordingly cautious about the adoption of TRIPS Plus
measures like data exclusivity.543

Another WHO report explains that pharmaceuticals are governed by two main
legal systems: drug regulatory and intellectual property.544 The former governs the
safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals, while the latter protects the fruits of creativity
in general.545 Data exclusivity is defended by its advocates because it bridges the two
systems.546 This bridging may lead to some unethical results such as the redundancy of
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administrative costs pertaining to marketing approval.547 This repeated cost might also
push many generic based companies out of the market because they would have less
competitive capacity compared to the original manufacturers.548 Eventually, consumer
access to medicines would be more limited.549 In addition, data exclusivity could make
compulsory licensing pointless, since generic pharmaceuticals would be denied
registration altogether during the protection period.550 Other effects of data exclusivity
might be the practical extension of patent terms, or to create de facto patents for non
patented products.551
Interestingly, the WHO report asserts that data exclusivity is a TRIPS Plus
measure.552 This conclusion is derived from the objectives of Article 39 of the TRIPS
Agreement.553 These objectives are centered around the concept of prevention of
unfair commercial use.554 The acceptance of the original "full clinical trials" by the
competent authorities is sufficient under the TRIPS to grant marketing approval for
pharmaceuticals. In case of this acceptance, third parties are waived from the
requirement of submitting their own test data. This waiver should not be understood as
an act of unfair commercial use.555 If third parties rely on previously accepted test
data, then, no claims of unfair commercial use on grounds of "industrial espionage"
can be proven.556 Regardless, no such espionage is possible if the data isn't secret.557
This point is confirmed in a UNCTAD558 – ICTSD559 publication.560 Despite the
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several interpretations of Article 39, developing countries are facilitating the entry of
new generic drugs to their markets.561 This is done by conforming to the secrecy
criteria set out in Article 39.562
At the WTO level no cases have been filed on grounds that data exclusivity
has been violated. The only exception has been a request for consultation with
Argentina submitted by the U.S. to the WTO DSB.563 This submission enumerated a
number of IP violations including data exclusivity.564 This case, however, was not
elevated to a DSB panel since the two parties reached a common resolution that was
notified to WTO.565 This case resolution did not include any obligations by Argentina
to apply data exclusivity. However, it allowed the U.S. to preserve the right to resort
to the DSB in the future for the same issue.566 The question remains, does the U.S.
have a viable legal position in its interpretation of Article 39 of the TRIPS? If the
answer is affirmative, why hasn't the U.S. taken the issue to the DSB instead of
directly pressuring developing countries to adopt data exclusivity? The logical answer
is that the U.S. policy makers know that they will not win on their position in the
WTO.
B. Conclusion
The Egypt has two levels of IPR protection to consider, the TRIPS and TRIPS
Plus. Egypt is already a WTO member, but its IPR Law still does not comply with
TRIPS provisions. Egypt's required compliance must be given priority by Egyptian
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policy makers despite TRIPS opposition. Many critics of the TRIPS fail to put the
overall advantages of the international trade context into consideration. The critics
take their short sighted views to a public that falls victim of stereotyped propaganda
messages about the negative effects of globalization. The TRIPS is a fact of Egyptian
foreign policy. Non – compliance with the TRIPS can thus affect any trade interest for
Egypt. Critics must know that non - compliance with the TRIPS can only lead to
discrediting the image of Egypt in international forums. Any clear IPR violation that is
met with inaction by trading partners is a sign of devaluation of Egypt as a developing
country. This would only damage foreign direct investment (FDI) opportunities, and
consequently, hinder Egypt's economic growth.
As explained in Chapter 3, Egypt's IPR Law does not comply with its
international obligations. Some provisions of the Law are poorly drafted.
Inconsistencies among the 4 Books are rife in terms of arrangement and language
used. Areas of deficiency in the Law must be remedied before Egypt undertakes any
serious joint FTA preparations with the U.S. Otherwise, negotiating with the U.S.
would only expose the Law's weaknesses, and the U.S. administration will never to
able to convince the Congress to approve an FTA with Egypt. Accordingly, a review
of the Law with is recommended with special emphasis on the following aspects:
1.

Stating patent
holders' rights in explicit terms in accordance with Article 28 of the TRIPS.

2.

Reconsidering
the expansive grounds for compulsory licensing endorsed by Article 23 of the
Law.

3.

Reflecting the
amendment of Article 31 of the TRIPS in Article 24.1 of the Law to enable the
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importation and exportation of pharmaceuticals produced under the compulsory
licensing system.
4.

Stating the
rights conferred to trademarks holders in explicit terms in accordance with Article
16 of the TRIPS.

5.

The inclusion
of the additional level of GIs protection for wines and spirits in the Law, in
accordance with Articles 23-24 of the TRIPS.

6.

Specifying
whether GIs shall be applied for services.

7.

Reconsidering
the necessity of including compulsory licensing for industrial designs.

8.

Applying the
conditions stipulated in Article 13 of the TRIPS for limitations on copyrights.

9.

Assuring that
Egypt has the right to apply the translation exceptions of copyrighted works into
Arabic, otherwise this provision must be omitted.

10.

Strengthening
criminal remedies in the Law.

11.

Expediting
accession to the UPOV and amending Book 4 of the Law in accordance.

When Egyptian policymakers assure that the Law is in conformity with
international obligations, the FTA could be considered. Comparatively, the Law falls
short of FTA standards. Some potential areas of sacrifices must be determined. Egypt
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needs to select its policy options for FTA negotiations in view of its public interests.
The most critical point is to protect its citizens' access to medicines as already
provided by the TRIPS. Data exclusivity measures must be avoided at all costs. The
same is true for putting serious limitations on compulsory licensing grounds.
Meanwhile, the unnecessary extensiveness of compulsory licensing grounds in the
Law should be reconsidered. Linking patents to marketing approvals could also have
negative effects on public health policy, and thus must be avoided. The consequences
of time compensation for the unreasonably prolonged patent or marketing approval
procedures lack clarity. In all cases, TRIPS Plus measures regarding undisclosed
information and patents must be nonnegotiable. The Government of Egypt would face
strong resistance if it tries to negotiate in these two areas.
In contrast, other IPR forms might be improved by applying some FTAs
measures. Areas like trademarks have no public interests contraindicating further
protection. The only point of question is the government’s capacity to carry out any
further commitments. For example, the FTAs oblige their parties to apply e – filing for
trademarks applications. The implementation of this obligation by Egypt could be
facilitated by technical assistance provided by the U.S. Likewise, there is also no
social dimension to applying TRIPS Plus measures to industrial designs. Enhanced
copyright protection could be a point of FDI attraction, especially for the computer
software industry. Egypt has sufficient skilled labor in this field which would benefit
by more job opportunities if foreign investment inflows increase. Another point of
comparative advantage for Egyptian software professionals is their ability to develop
Arabic software, which is in highly demand in Arab countries. Fears about
dissemination of knowledge if the current level of copyright protection is elevated
could be avoided by concluding agreements with publishers at reduced prices.
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It is pointless to adhere to the TRIPS level of border measures which are only
complementary to enforcement efforts already exerted in the domestic market. Better
border enforcement can rather relieve such domestic efforts by blocking surges of IPR
infringing imports from entering the market. Egypt can apply border measures to
exportation and free zones at minimal costs, and thus be more eligible to join an FTA
with the U.S. Border measures are issued in Egypt by a ministerial decree. The
inclusion of the TRIPS Plus border measures is easy compared to the amendment of
the IPR Law, which would have to be passed by the People's Assembly (the
Parliament) pending a presidential decree for the official issuance. The better
enforcement of IPR also has other important roles in consumer protection.
Finally, Egypt can consider some of the TRIPS Plus provisions in areas of less
social sensitivity. These could be offered instead of the U.S. demands of TRIPS Plus
measures in patents or data exclusivity. Another approach might be to trade off other
international trade areas like investment facilitation or trade in services with IPR.
However, if the U.S. insists during the negotiations on applying TRIPS Plus to these
fields, Egypt should make a clear assessment of the exact negative consequences for
its social interests. The results of this assessment would constitute a stronger ground
for bargaining with the U.S. than the absolute rejection of the whole matter. Empirical
evidence of these negative effects could constitute persuasive arguments for Egypt
that the ensuing costs of the U.S. demands are intolerable to its current level of
development. Egypt can also request the U.S. to provide aid to Egyptian segments that
would be seriously affected by the adoption of the TRIPS Plus provisions in health
related fields. Many programs could be planned in this regard like the participation of
the U.S. pharmaceuticals companies in offering their products at reduced prices to the

91

most vulnerable social segments. Another alternative is expanding and improving the
health insurance coverage programs to make them more reliable for Egyptians.
The remaining challenge to concluding an FTA between Egypt and the U.S. is
the role of any hidden political agendas of the respective White House
administrations. It is probable that these agendas played a critical role in aborting
former FTA plans, and preventing officials on both sides from even starting the
negotiations process. If the political barriers are still in place, then there is little chance
that any FTA can be concluded. The mystery remains as to reasons behind the U.S.
introduction of the FTA preparations in the first place. The withdrawal by the U.S. of
the FTA preparations without disclosure of reasons leaves the Egyptians with
questions about wasting time and efforts in pursuing the FTA. With this withdrawal,
did the U.S. intend then to convey a message to the Egyptians that the democracy
achievements of Egypt are still weak to enable an FTA conclusion? If so, is Egypt
deficient in terms of democracy in comparison with other Arab countries that are
already parties to FTAs with the U.S.? Some of these countries have human rights
records that are the same or even worse than that of Egypt. U.S. reasons remain
veiled.
In conclusion, the U.S. highly politicizes its decisions for joining FTAs with
Arab countries. The political factor is crucial for all U.S. FTAs regardless of the level
of development of its trading partners. However, this political factor is magnified
while making FTA decisions concerning the Middle East, currently the most turbulent
region in the world. The U.S. decision making process becomes more complicated for
key Middle Eastern countries like Egypt which is endowed with a large population,
strategic location and great role in the Middle East stability. Egypt's advantages
should facilitate the conclusion of an FTA with the U.S. Objective assessment of the
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commercial and political benefits of an FTA with Egypt would probably encourage
the U.S. to seek its conclusion. A clear indication of the greater potential for the FTA
to come into being is the elevation of Egypt in the 2008 USTR Special 301 Report
from the "Priority Watch List" to the "Watch List".567 In addition, the 2008 NTE
Report has diluted its criticism of IP protection in Egypt.568 In its 2008 conclusions,
the USTR acknowledged Egyptian improvements in the fields of patent inspection and
marketing approvals.
The biggest obstacle to this FTA seems to be the confused policy of the Bush
Administration in the Middle East. The offensive agenda of this Administration may
obscure the U.S vision of its bilateral interests with these countries. This agenda also
deprives the U.S. of developing a clear regional approach for the Middle East,
especially compared with that of the E.C. The coming U.S. presidential elections may
result in a more rational Administration that would reform the U.S. foreign policy and
lead to greater trade opportunities.
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